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FROM FREE TRADE TO PROHIBITION:
A CRITICAL HISTORY OF THE
MODERN ASIAN OPIUM TRADE
Alfred W. McCoy*
INTRODUCnTON
America's current war on drugs represents a misuse of its power
and a misperception of the global narcotics trade. In 1999, the
White House issued the National Drug Control Strategy, announc-
ing a multi-year program "to reduce illegal drug use and availabil-
ity 50 percent," and thereby achieve "the lowest recorded drug-use
rate in American history."1 Despite emphasizing domestic initia-
tives and promising balanced programs to reduce supply and de-
mand, the Strategy rests ultimately upon eradicating the
international supply of illicit drugs.2
To achieve this sudden reduction in drug availability, the Strategy
aims to "reduce" trafficker success in the U.S., 3 "reduce" foreign
drug cultivation,4 "reduce" the drug flow in transit zones,5 and "re-
duce" drug shipments from source countries like Burma and Co-
lombia.6 Read closely, however, this is a strategy that requires not
* Alfred W. McCoy is a professor of history at the University of Wisconsin-
Madison and has spent the past quarter-century studying Southeast Asia. He has fo-
cused extensively on modem Philippines history and the politics of opium in the
Golden Triangle.
1. U.S. OFmcE OF NAT'L DRUG CONTROL POLICY, THE NATIONAL DRUG CON-
TROL STRATEGY, 1999 2 (1998) ("The Strategy focuses on prevention, treatment, re-
search, lawv enforcement, protection of our borders, and international cooperation."),
available at http'l/www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/policy/99ndcslcontents.html [here-
inafter NATIONAL STRATEGY].
2. I at 43 ("Eliminating the cultivation of illicit coca and opium is the best ap-
proach to combating cocaine and heroin availability in the United States.").
3. Id. at 72 ("Drug traffickers are adaptable, reacting to interdiction successes by
shifting routes and changing modes of transportation. Large international criminal
organizations have extensive access to sophisticated technology and resources to sup-
port their illegal operations. The United States must surpass traffickers' flexibility,
quickly deploying resources to changing high-threat areas.").
4. Id. at 79 ("Widely dispersed growing areas, multiple trafficking organizations,
and diversified routes and concealment methods make supply reduction difficult.").
5. Id. at 73 ("Stopping drugs in the transit zone involves more than intercepting
drug shipments at sea or in the air. It also entails denying traffickers safe haven in
countries within the transit zone and preventing their ability to corrupt institutions or
use financial systems to launder profits.").
6. Id. at 79 ("The United States will continue supporting U.N. drug-control pro-
grams in Burma and encourage other countries to press the Burmese government to
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just supply-reduction, but the prohibition of global narcotics
production.7
To understand the flaws in this prohibition strategy, we first need
to shift focus from the domestic to the international arena; then,
move beyond the usual four or ten-year timeframe and place the
drug war in a 200-year perspective; and, above all, explore the
likely impact of such repression upon global narcotics traffic. The
government's strategy assumes inelasticities within the global drug
trade and thus anticipates a simple, direct connection between re-
pression and results. In the open world that has followed the Cold
War, however, the key variables of supply and demand have be-
come surprisingly elastic. In this new world order, repression may
actually stimulate global opium production and contribute to a
rapid increase in U.S. heroin supply.
If history is any guide, Asia's opium production may soon in-
crease to levels that will defeat the war on drugs now being waged
by the United States and the United Nations. Whatever suppres-
sion strategy they adopt, present trends in opiate production and
consumption indicate that world supply is likely to expand into the
foreseeable future, compromising the prohibition that both organi-
zations have pursued for the past quarter-century.
Opium production is soaring in Southeast Asia, Central Asia,
and Latin America.8 According to U.S. State Department statis-
tics, global opium production nearly doubled in the past dec-
ade-from 2242 tons in 1987 to 4285 tons in 1996.9 If we use the
larger and more reliable U.N. figures for Afghanistan, then world
production rose even more sharply to 4355 tons in 1996 and 5778
tons in 1999.10 In a major study released in 1997, the U.N. reported
that global drug traffic in heroin, cocaine, marijuana, and amphet-
take effective anti-drug action. In Colombia, the United States will provide additional
support to ... opium poppy eradication campaign[s].").
7. Id. (noting that the U.S. will work to increase international levels of coopera-
tion with the United Nations Drug Control Programme ("UNDCP") in order to
achieve the lofty goal of "eradicat[ing] illicit opium poppy cultivation in ten years").
8. BUREAU FOR INT'L NARCOTICS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT AFFAIRS, U.S.
DEP'T OF STATE, INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL STRATEGY REPORT, 1997
24-25 (1998), http://wwwv.state.gov/wwvw/global/narcotics,-aw11997-_narc__reportpolicy.
html [hereinafter 1997 REPORT].
9. M
10. UNITED NATIONS OFFICE FOR DRUG CONTROL & CRIME PREVENTION,
GLOBAL ILLICIT DRUG TRENDS 2000, at 34 (2000) (charting global illicit cultivation of
opium poppy and production of opium for years 1987-1999) [hereinafter, GLOBAL
ILLICIT DRUG TRENDS 2000]. In 1999, Afghanistan alone accounted for production of
4565 tons of opium. Id.
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amines is a $400 billion industry, involving fifty-one million users
and 8% of world trade, accounting for more than even textiles.11
Driven by growing supplies of cheap, pure heroin, drug use is
rising in the established markets of Western Europe and the
United States, and spreading rapidly into the newer markets of
China, India, Russia, and Eastern Europe.12 Over the past thirty
years, for example, the estimated number of heroin users in the
United States has increased more than ten-fold, from 68,00013 to
some 810,000 chronic users today. 4 More recently, British Colum-
bia needed just a decade to achieve the same rate of increase, as
evidenced by its ten-fold rise in heroin overdose deaths during the
1990s.15 If current circumstances persist, there is nothing to re-
strain world opium supply from continuing its present pattern of
doubling every decade: 1200 tons in 1971, 2600 tons in 1987, 4800
tons in 1997, 10,000 tons in 2007, and a daunting 40,000 tons by
2027.16 To put it simply, can we really expect that the availability
of heroin in the U.S. will, as the White House promises, drop by
50% by 2007, if the world's supply doubles by that same date?
The reasons for this dismal outlook are largely historical. Look-
ing back over the last three centuries of the modern opium trade,
we can discern two major Western policy regimes towards narcot-
11. Christopher S. Wren, U.N. Report Says Tens of Millions Use Illicit Drugs, N.Y.
TINIES, June 26, 1997, at A12 ("According to the report, the cultivation of opium
poppies has expanded to cover more than 691,000 acres, mostly in Asia, with more
than 300 tons of heroin believed to be produced annually.").
12. GLO1AL ILLICIT DRUG TRENDS 2000, supra note 10, at 178 (stating that devel-
oping countries and countries in transition are the states most notably affected by
rising rates of opium consumption); United Nation Drug Control Programme, Key
Statistics: Illicit Drug Production, Trafficking, and Consumption (1998) (discussing
UNDCP estimates for drug cultivation and consumption for years 1990-1997), http://
%vwv.odccp.org/adhoc/gass/info2.htm.
13. EDWARD JAY EPSTEIN, AGENCY OF FEAR: OPIATES AND POLITICAL POWER IN
AMERICA 173-77 (1977) (stating how the number of heroin addicts in America in-
creased from 68,000 in 1969 to a remarkable 559,000 in 1971).
14. NATIONAL STRATEGY, supra note 1, at 30 (noting that heroin usage among
8th, 10th, and 12th graders has increased during the 1990).
15. Sam Howe Verhovek, Conference Seeks Ways to Reduce Heroin Deaths, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 16, 2000, at A16 (stating that British Columbia suffered 407 overdose
deaths in 1999).
16. GLOBAL ILLICIT DRUG TRENDS 2000, supra note 10, at 34; U.S. CABINET
COMM. ON INT'L NARCOTICS CONTROL, WORLD Opiumvw SURVEY 1972 7, 11, All-15
(1972) [hereinafter WORLD OPIUM SURVEY]. This report estimated world illicit pro-
duction for 1971 at 990-1210 tons but omitted Iran, which was then growing opium
legally for distribution to registered users. Id. Since Iran's opium has moved between
illicit and licit categories in various reports over the past half century, Iran's "licit" 156
tons have been added to the minimum "illicit" total, allowing the higher estimate of
1200 tons.
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ics. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the great powers
were aggressive in their promotion of a "free trade" in opium. 7
This legal commerce produced a steady increase in world opium
production, reaching an historic high of 41,000 tons in 1906.11 Dur-
ing the nineteenth century, this commerce established opium as a
commodity and enmeshed Asian poppy farmers and urban addicts
in a global economy. In the twentieth century, by contrast, the
world powers ignored opium's character as a commodity and
moved resolutely to prohibit all narcotics use. After World War I,
a global prohibition campaign led by the United States and the
League 'of Nations produced a sharp decline in the legal opium
trade.19 In response to this market opportunity, however, new
criminal syndicates soon emerged in Europe and Asia, managing a
global traffic in this now illicit commodity.2 °
This succession of policy regimes, from free trade to prohibition,
created a vast illicit commerce that may well survive any attempt at
suppression-short of near-perfect coercion. In sum, the collision
of these policies has unleashed uncontrolled, little-understood mar-
ket forces and produced a sustained, sometimes explosive growth
in world opium supply.
At its peak in the "long" nineteenth century, imperial trade
transformed opium into a major commodity-embedding its pro-
duction into the tribal economies of highland Asia and its con-
17. OM PRAKASH, THE DUTCH EAST INDIA COMPANY AND THE ECONOIY OF
BENGAL, 1630-1720, at 153 (1985) (describing how the Dutch East India Company
faced challenges to its opium monopoly by Asian and European competitors, includ-
ing Indians, Armenians, Indonesians, Malays, Chinese, Danes, Portuguese, and En-
glish); DAVID EDWARD OWEN, BRITISH OPIUM POLICY IN CHINA AND INDIA 18
(1968) ("Although the use of opium had existed in the Far East from remote times, it
was left to the European to organize the industry on a large scale.").
18. HAMILTON WRIGHT, REPORT ON THE INT'L OPIUM COMM1'N AND ON THE
OPIUM PROBLEM AS SEEN WITHIN THE UNITED STATES AND ITS POSSESSIONS, S. Doc.
No. 61-377 (1910) [hereinafter REP. ON INT'L OPIUM COrM'N]; see also Erik Grant
Luna, Our Vietnam: The Prohibition Apocalypse, 46 DEPAUL L. REv. 483, 499-504
(1997) (discussing the implications of the First Opium Commission and the impact of
Dr. Hamilton Wright on opium prohibition).
19. See ARNOLD H. TAYLOR, AMERICAN DIPLOMACY AND THE NARCOTICS TRAF-
Fic, 1900-1939 146-70 (1969) (discussing the tenuous but sometimes fruitful relation-
ship shared by the United States and the League of Nations).
20. Id. at 280 ("By 1934 the operation of the Geneva and Narcotic Limitation
Conventions had virtually ended excess manufacture in the principal European manu-
facturing countries, but it had driven such activities to previously non-manufacturing
countries in southern Europe where the raw products were produced.... As a result,
the Far East, because of unstable political conditions, became the main center for
illicit activities.").
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sumption into the urban cultures of Asia and the West.21 At this
high-tide of empire, European powers deployed market and mili-
tary coercion, both to promote and prohibit opium-promoting
free trade and mass consumption, but prohibiting cultivation in re-
gions that weakened their monopolies. When the major powers
launched a complete prohibition in the early twentieth century,
they were, in effect, trying to eradicate a commodity with deep eco-
nomic roots that gave it an exceptional resilience. Failing to under-
stand the character of this commodity, the international
community sought its suppression with a range of inappropriate,
and ultimately ineffective, policies. Those measures included ar-
resting consumers, pursuing dealers, and harassing growers.
All these measures derive from a law-enforcement model that
assumes inelasticities within the illicit drug industry and thus
presumes a perfect coercion, an axiomatic correlation between re-
pression and results. When states have proven capable of such per-
fect coercion, in either colonial Asia or communist China,
determined multilateral or unilateral suppression has had a deci-
sive, dramatic impact upon both the production and consumption
of illicit drugs.
In the latter decades of the twentieth century, however, a waning
of these coercive capacities-colonial, national, and, finally, com-
munist-opened Asia, for the first time in nearly two centuries, to
unbridled economic and social forces. At this historical juncture in
the last quarter of the twentieth century, the U.S. and U.N. intensi-
fied their suppression operations, focusing on opium's growers,
traders, and smugglers. This collision of policy regimes would pro-
duce unintended outcomes, transforming localized suppression into
global stimulus by raising prices and encouraging cultivation.
Moreover, the transition beyond the last of these coercive political
orders, communism, allowed a recrudescence of primordial politi-
cal forces-religion, ethnicity, and regionalism-that further stimu-
lated Asia's opium production.
In our new world order without blocs or empires, repression may
prove counterproductive-not simply failing to suppress, but actu-
ally stimulating the global opium traffic. Repression requires in-
21. CHARLS IssAwI, Tim ECONOMIC HISTORY OF IRAN, 1800-1914, at 238-41
(1972) (stating that it took until after the Second World War for opium to lose the
importance it had enjoyed in Iranian agriculture and trade); TERRY M. PARSSINEN,
SECRET PASSIONS, SECRET REmEDIES: NARCOTIC DRUGS IN BRITISH SOCIETY, 1820-
1930, at 32-33 (1983) (discussing opium's popularity for medicinal purposes in Great
Britain).
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elasticity. That is, when force is applied within a closed universe,
the targeted criminal behavior or illicit commodity is squeezed and
then crushed in a vice-grip of coercion. These dynamics work
when, for example, local police attack drug distribution within the
spatial confines of an urban neighborhood, arresting dealers, seiz-
ing drugs, and patrolling prime locations.
When the same model is applied to the international heroin
trade, however, the effort often fails because there are no limits to•
either supply or demand. Both are, in effect, elastic. As the vice-
jaws of coercion tighten, supply and demand slip sideways into a
spatial infinity. Because opium can be grown anywhere in temper-
ate or highland Asia, crop suppression simply shifts cultivation to a
new locale within the vastness of the Eurasian landmass. Further-
more, because physiology makes all humanity potential addicts, re-
pression merely forces traffickers to seek new markets in other
neighborhoods, nations, or continents. With such elastic con-
straints, the baton of repression becomes instead a prod pushing
consumption and production into ever-widening spheres and com-
pounding the global drug problem.
Predicting the shape of the future from the confusion of the pre-
sent remains an uncertain enterprise. With the end of the Cold
War, it seems possible that a peculiar complex of historical factors
may continue to drive an explosive increase in Asia's opium pro-
duction. During the Cold War, much of Asia's prime opium land,
markets, and smuggling routes were closed to market forces under
communist rule in China and the Soviet Union. With the collapse
of the Iron Curtain, market opportunity and post-socialist poverty
have combined in ways that are creating vast new sources of supply
and demand for Asia's illicit opium.
Above all, the current marriage of a prohibition policy and an
increasingly imperfect source-country suppression is playing a cen-
tral role in raising global poppy production. Thrown together by
the forces of history, ethnic warlords, highland peasants, and crimi-
nal syndicates are driving a rapid expansion in Asia's opium har-
vest that may defeat any attempt at supply-side reduction to the
world's heroin problem. Indeed, these forces are making heroin,
for the first time in its century-long history, something of a world
drug whose production, distribution, and consumption are rapidly
reaching every quarter of the globe. In such an international envi-
ronment, there is no reason that world opium supply cannot reach,
or even surpass, its historic 1906 high of 41,000 tons by 2027.
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This dismal view runs counter to the current drug control strate-
gies of both the United States and the United Nations. With his
appointment of General Barry McCaffrey as his "Drug Czar" after
the 1996 elections, U.S. President William Clinton renewed his
commitment to the war on drugs.22 Similarly, in November 1997,
the new head of the U.N. Drug Control Programme, Dr. Pino
Arlacchi, 23 announced a ten-year program to eliminate all opium
and coca cultivation, starting in Afghanistan. The underlying logic
of these suppression strategies, bilateral and multilateral, remains
supply reduction. 4 Significant increases in the world's opium sup-
ply will, quite clearly, subvert these attempts at a supply-side solu-
tion to the global drug problem.
If these programs do in fact fail, the reason may lie in heroin's
little understood character as a commodity. Over the past 200
years, opium has emerged as a major global commodity, similar to
other stimulants such as coffee and tea.2s By the time the United
Nations prohibited non-medicinal opiate use in 1961, the trade in
legal stimulants-coffee, tea, and tobacco-ranked in the world's
top twenty commodities with petroleum, wheat, and cotton.2 6 If
we had sufficient statistical evidence, opium may well have ranked
22. E.g., Editorial, American Drug Aid Goes South, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 1996, at
A14 (discussing how American money sent to Colombia for the purposes of "combat-
ing cocaine and promoting democracy and human rights" has occasionally been used
to fund counterinsurgency activities); see also Diana Jean Schemo and Tun Golden,
Bogota Aid: To Fight Drugs or Rebels?, N.Y. TiMEs, Jun. 2, 1998, at Al (alleging that
"more United States training and equipment are going to shore up basic deficiencies
in the tactics, mobility and firepower of the Colombian military, rather than for oper-
ations directed at the drug trade").
23. Dr. Arlacchi's approach to drug control is not surprising considering his back-
ground as an opponent of organized crime in his native Italy. As an advisor to
the Ministry of the Interior, Dr. Arlacchi established the Direzione Investigativa
Antimafia ("DIA"), a law enforcement agency commissioned with combating organ-
ized crime. BIOGRAPHY OF PINo ARLAccHi, at http://www.undcp.orgbiography-
executivedirector.html.
24. Christopher S. Wren, At Drug Summit, Clinton Asks Nations to Set Aside
Blame, N.Y. TiMES, June 9, 1998, at A6 (stating that President Clinton, at a U.N.-
sponsored drug summit, called for both drug-producing and consuming countries to
cooperate in fighting illicit drugs). The speakers at the U.N. summit also reaffirmed
their reluctance to legalization as a possible solution. "There will always be those who
are ready to throw in the towel," stated Secretary General Kofi Annan, "[b]ut we
must never give in to the human toll drugs are taking on our societies." Id.
British Deputy Prime Minister, John Prescott, advocated demand reduction as a
more effective way to combat the drug trade. "It is no use stopping opium cultivation
in one place just to see more grown elsewhere. We gain nothing by closing one traf-
ficking route to see another opened." Id.
25. J.W.F. RowE, PRIMARY COMMODITIES IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 5 (1965).
26. Id.
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just as high in 1906, when global drug supply reached its historic
peak. In short, by the time prohibition started, opium had already
achieved the economic scale, social ramifications, and political sup-
port needed to resist repression.
Commodities, however, are not mere trade goods. They are the
building blocks of modem material life. Their production is essen-
tial to third-world survival, and their consumption is integral to
first-world lifestyles. Through his long and distinguished career,
the American anthropologist Sidney W. Mintz has taught that the
modem commerce in commodities involves much more than mere
exchange.27 In his last book, Sweetness and Power, he argued that:
"The first sweetened cup of hot tea to be drunk by an English
worker was a significant historical event because it prefigured the
transformation of an entire society, a total remaking of its eco-
nomic and social basis." To this insight, one might add that from
the late eighteenth century onward, sugar, tea, and opium have be-
come integral parts of expanding world trade, woven into the fabric
of modem life.
Thus, this relentless increase in opium supply may well, in the
near future, raise questions about the underlying rationality of the
reigning prohibition orthodoxy. Through a comparative history of
Asia's opium trade in two regions-the continent's Southeast and
Southwest-one can see whether the shape of the future can in-
deed be found in the past.
HISTORICAL TRENDs
Surveying the history of opium in Asia over the last millennium,
one can discern distinct phases shaped by both scale and quality of
its commerce. By the eighth century A.D., opium had spread from
the eastern Mediterranean to China, creating an Asian "opium
zone" that extended for over 5000 miles across the continent's
southern rim, from Turkey to China. Even today, more than a mil-
lennium later, more than 93% of the world's illicit opium is pro-
27. E.g., SIDNEY W. MINTZ, TASTING FOOD, TASTING FREEDOM: EXCURSIONS
INTO EATING, CULTURE, AND THE PAST (1996) (discussing how luxury foods such as
alcohol, chocolate, and sugar came to be consumed by not only the wealthy but also
the general public). Mr. Mintz is an economic anthropologist at Johns Hopkins Uni-
versity, concentrating in peasant society, food, and life history in the Caribbean and
Latin America.
28. SIDNEY W. MINTZ, SWEETNESS AND POWER: THE PLAcE OF SUGAR IN MOD.
ERN HISTORY 214 (1985).
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duced in a similar zone that spans from Turkey to Thailand.29
Then, in the sixteenth century, India's Mughal empire developed a
modest commerce in opium as a recreational drug.30 With the ex-
pansion of European empires in Asia, colonial opium trading en-
couraged a rapid expansion of production in this opium zone from
the late seventeenth to the early twentieth century. 1 Starting in
the late nineteenth century, moreover, mass opium consumption
grew rapidly in the West, amplified by the popularization of heroin
after 1898.32
During the inter-war period from 1925 to 1941, however, a
global prohibition movement, led by the United States and the
League of Nations, produced a significant decrease in legal opiates
production in both Asia and Europe.3 3 Although this campaign ef-
fected a sharp decline in legal opium consumption, criminal syndi-
cates soon emerged to take control, in both China and the West, of
a now-illicit drug traffic. Then, starting in the early 1950s, Asia's
opium production recovered steadily. Driven by rising demand
and the changing geopolitics of the Cold War, Asian opium pro-
duction soon soared to 3700 tons by 1990.3 4 Most recently, in the
aftermath of the Cold War, Asia's harvest has continued to grow,
raising global opium supply to 5700 tons in 1999 and fueling a
global proliferation of heroin consumption.35
FREE TRADE IN OPIUM
Within this larger context, there seems to be two critical phases
in opium's modem history-an expanding free trade in drugs from
the late eighteenth to the early twentieth century and, since the
1920s, an aggressive attempt at prohibition. Since this juxtaposi-
tion of policy regimes seems the source of the current growth in
29. OWvEN, supra note 17, at 1-17 (providing a historical introduction to global
opium trade); BUREAU FOR INT'L NARCOTICS AND LAW ENFoRcEmENT AFFAIRS,
U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL STRATEGY REPORT,
1998 22-23 (1999) [hereinafter 1998 REPORT].
30. OWEN, supra note 17, at 2-5.
31. Id. at 6-17; TAYLOR, supra note 19, at 1-19 (discussing problems with opium in
the United States during the nineteenth century).
32. id.; PETER D. LoWEs, TiE GENESIS oF INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CON-
TROL 91 (1966) ("But smoking opium as a major social problem in the U.S.A., though
it spread across the country, had a limited duration. It had early been associated with
undesirables on the fringe of society .... ").
33. TAYLOR, supra note 19, at 124-32, 146-50.
34. GLOBAL ILLICIT DRUG TRENDS, supra note 10, at 34 (setting the combined
total for Asian opium production at 3698 tons).
35. Id.
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both production and consumption, each phase requires a closer
study.
When European trading companies reached Asia in the six-
teenth century, opium was just emerging as a significant commod-
ity within intra-Asian trade. During this century, residents of
Persia and India began eating and drinking opium mixtures as a
recreational euphoric. Indeed, under the reign of Akbar (1556-
1605), the great Mughal state of north India relied upon opium
land as a significant source of revenue.36 Although cultivation cov-
ered the whole Mughal empire, it was concentrated in two main
areas-upriver from Calcutta along the Ganges Valley for Bengal
opium and upcountry from Bombay in the west for Malwa
opium. 37
The rise of Europe's mercantile empires from the seventeenth
century slowly transformed Asia's opium trade, amplifying its scale
and changing its dominant use from medicinal to recreational, ad-
ding a new dimension to the drug, whose use had been, for several
millenia, largely medicinal.38 Because opium combined the inelas-
tic demand of a basic foodstuff, such as rice, with the low weight
and high mark-up of a luxury item, such as cloves or pepper, it was
the epoch's ideal trade good, bringing empires extraordinary prof-
its. In the 1640s, the Dutch East India Company ("VOC") entered
the India-China opium trade, stimulating both supply and
demand.39
As Dutch colonials negotiated monopoly rights for Java's popu-
lous districts, their company's opium imports from India rose dra-
matically from 617 kilograms in 1660 to 72,280 only twenty-five
years later.40 Buying opium cheap in India and selling high in Java
provided the VOC a 400% profit on its shipments in 1679.41 By the
end of the century, the Dutch dominated the India-China opium
trade and profited accordingly.42 No longer a lightweight luxury or
36. OwEN, supra note 17, at 5-6.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 51 ("[T]he drug had been known in China for centuries, but its adapta-
tion to Chinese taste had been a comparatively recent development.").
39. PRAKASH, supra note 17, at 145-57.
40. Id. at 145.
41. Id. at 145-51.
42. Id.; see also Jan van Ours, The Price Elasticity of Hard Drugs: The Case of
Opium in the Dutch East Indies, 1923-1938, 103 J. oF POL. ECON. 261-79 (1995) (dis-
cussing price elasticity of opium in the Dutch Indies).
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medicine, the opium trade was starting to achieve the scale that
would, over the next two centuries, make it a major commodity.43
Opium's emergence as a commodity gained momentum in the
late eighteenth century. Under the doctrine of mercantilism, the
more successful European colonial ventures in Asia involved com-
mercialization of drugs in some form-whether caffeine, nicotine,
or opiates. Starting in the late eighteenth century, European trade
transformed these drugs from luxury goods into commodities of
mass consumption, making them integral to the economies and
lifestyles of both Asian and Atlantic nations. The Dutch controlled
Java's coffee exports, the Spanish established their tobacco monop-
oly in the Philippines, and the British monopolized the Bengal
opium trade. Within the monopolistic practice of mercantilism, the
British East India Company imposed central controls over Ben-
gal's opium-raising Indian exports to China from thirteen tons in
1729 to 2558 tons in 1839." Compounding the trade's profitability,
China prohibited the drug from 1729 to 1858, thus conceding Euro-
pean merchants a de-facto monopoly.45
In 1773, the modem era in Asia's opium trade began when War-
ren Hastings,46 the Governor-General of Bengal, established a co-
lonial monopoly that made the drug India's leading export.47 Over
the next 130 years, Britain actively promoted opium exports to
China, defying Chinese drug laws and fighting two wars to open
43. J.F. Richards, The Indian Empire and Peasant Production of Opium in the
Nineteenth Century, 15 MOD. AsAN STUD. 59-62 (1981).
44. MICHAEL GREENBERG, BRITISH TRADE AND THE OPENING OF CHINA, 1800-
42, at 221 (1951); OWEN, supra note 17, at 51-52, 113-45; JOSHUA ROw~NTREE, TiH
IMPERIAL DRUG TRADE 284-86 (1905).
45. OWEN, supra note 17, at 16 ("The unique feature of this early edict [prohibit-
ing opium] was that all parties to the transaction were to be punished severely save
only the buyer, who himself had prepared his doom. Keepers of opium shops, like
'propagators of depraved doctrines,' Were to be strangled after a short imprisonment,
while assistants might expect a hundred blows with the bamboo and banishment a
thousand miles from their homes.").
46. MARTIN BOOTH, OPIUM, A HISTORY 111-12 (1998). Governor Hastings faced a
difficult decision regarding the opium trade. On the one hand, the Governor reacted
negatively to the reduced efficiency of his native labor force, which had become habit-
ual users of opiates. Id. at 111. On the other hand, prohibiting the opium trade en-
tirely would have drastically severed a major source of revenue. Id. The Governor's
solution to grant an opium monopoly is best explained by his statement: "Opium is
not a necessity of life but a pernicious article of luxury, which ought not to be permit-
ted except for purposes of foreign commerce only, and which the wisdom of the Gov-
ernment should carefully restrain from internal consumption." Id. at 111-12.
47. OWEN, supra note 17, at 23-25 (noting that the Bengal council unanimously
adopted a resolution granting opium monopoly to Bengal government).
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the empire's opium market for its merchants.48 Under new proce-
dures introduced in 1797, the East India Company, and the colo-
nial state that succeeded it, controlled opium from cultivation
through processing to export.49 Bengal's opium country stretched
for 500 miles across the Ganges River Valley, with over a million
registered farmers growing poppy plants exclusively for the
company.50
For its first quarter-century, this system assured prosperity for
British India and a stable opium supply for China. Opium re-
mained a staple of colonial finances, providing from 6-15% of Brit-
ish India's tax revenues during the nineteenth century.51 More
importantly, these opium exports were an essential component of
an India-China-Britain "triangular trade" central to London's com-
mercial empire. Trade figures for the 1820s, for example, show that
the triangular exchange was large and well-balanced-£22 million
worth of Indian opium and cotton to China; £20 million in Chinese
tea to Britain; and, £24 million in British textiles and machinery
back to India.52 In managing this trade, the East India Company
prized stability above profit, and for over twenty years held India's
opium exports at 4000 chests (with 140 pounds of opium each)-
just enough to finance its purchase of China's tea crop. 3
The system's success was the cause of its downfall. Profits at-
tracted competitors, and the Company's refusal to raise Bengal's
opium exports beyond the quota of 4000 chests per annum left a
vast unmet demand for drugs in China.54 As demand drove the
48. BOOTH, supra note 46, at 133-37, 144-46. The First Opium War lasted from
1839-1842, culminating in the Treaty of Nanking, which opened up China to trade and
ceded Hong Kong to the British. Id. at 134-35. Not much was solved in the conflict,
prompting one author to note, "[Opium was not only the cause of the first Anglo-
Chinese conflict but also the winner." Id. at 137. The Second Opium War, far bloodier
than its predecessor, began in 1856 and lasted until 1860. Id.
49. Id. at 112-16.
50. SIR JOHN STRACHEY, INDIA: ITS ADMINISTRATION AND PROGRESS 13342
(1903).
51. OwEN, supra note 17, at vii; see also J.F. Richards, The Indian Empire and
Peasant Production of Opium in the Nineteenth Century, 15 MOD. ASIAN STUD. 59, 61-
66 (1981) (arguing that the opium monopoly in British India was a successful system,
whose policies suggest techniques for modem markets).
52. Tan Chung, The Britain-China-India Trade Triangle 1771-1840, in ESSAYS IN
MODERN INDIAN ECONOMic HISTORY 114-30 (Sabyasachi Bhattacharya ed., 1987);
Richards, supra note 51, at 67-69.
53. Chung, supra note 52, at 118-120; OwEN, supra note 17, at 131 n.57 ("To say
that London paid for its tea with opium is more than a pleasant generalization. In
1836-1837, for example, teas to the value of 20,225,065 dollars were shipped out, while
19,746,759 dollars' worth of opium was imported.").
54. Tan Chung, supra note 52, at 119-30.
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price per chest upward from Rs.115 in 1799 to Rs.2,428 just fifteen
years later, the East India Company's monopoly on Bengal opium
faced strong competition from Turkey and west India.55
Britain's most daring rivals were the Americans. 6 Barred from
bidding at the Calcutta auctions, Yankee traders loaded their first
cargoes of Turkish opium at Smyrna in 1805 and sailed them
around the tip of Africa to China.57 Within a decade, opium com-
prised 30% of all U.S. cargoes reaching China.5 8 Although the
Americans increased their shipments from 102 chests in 1805 to
1428 twenty-five years later, their largest cargoes were still just a
quarter of the 5672 chests the British brought from Bengal.5 9 De-
termined to defend their monopoly, the Company's directors de-
cided to promote unlimited production in Bengal, thereby
producing opium at prices which made competition unprofitable.
Within the decade, fifteen new opium districts opened, doubling
60cultivation to 176,000 acres.
After the East India Company lost its charter in 1834, the infor-
mal regulation of the China opium trade collapsed, allowing Amer-
ican and British merchant captains to take control and launch a
fleet of new opium clippers.6' Among the ninety-five clippers in
the fleet, Calcutta's Cowasjee family owned six, the Americans of
Russell & Co. had eight, and the British giants, Dent and Jardine,
operated twenty-seven.62 India's export boom flooded the China
coast with illicit opium, rending the fragile political fabric that had
veiled the smuggling trade for decades. As the Company's grip
weakened, China's imports increased ten-fold-from 270 tons in
55. lit
56. BOOTH, supra note 46, at 113. After a prohibitive imperial edict in 1799, the
transport of Opium to China required surreptitious means to avoid detection. Id. The
transport vessels often were "disguised, flew flags of convenience, were armed, and
carried a detachment of soldiers." Id.
57. Charles C. Stelle, American Trade in Opium to China in the Nineteenth Cen-
tury, 9 PAC. HIsT. REv. 425, 427-42 (1940).
58. d.
59. GREENBERG, supra note 44, at 221.
60. OvEN, supra note 17, at 105-08; Richards, supra note 51, at 65.
61. Id. at 115 ("The clippers, owned by firms, individuals, or ad hoc partnerships,
were small vessels, constructed for speed and destined to carry cargoes of little bulk
but large value. Their swift keeps set records, unapproached by the unwieldy East
Indiamen, for the passage to China."). For additional background on these ships, see
BASIL LUBBOCK, THE CHINA CLIPPERS (1914), which attempts to preserve the histo-
ries of these vessels.
62. EDOUARD STACKPOLE, CAvrAIN PREsco-rr AND THE OPIUM SMUGGLERS 34-
43 (1954); OWEN, supra note 17, at 115-116, 183-93; LUBBOCK, supra note 61, at 382-
84.
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1820 to 2555 tons twenty years later.63 Opium addiction spread
rapidly, reaching some three million Chinese addicts by the 1830s
and provoking some angst among the British clergy. 64
After Britain won the Second Opium War and forced China to
legalize the drug in 1858, opium became a major global commod-
ity, produced and traded on the scale of stimulants such as coffee
and tea. In the war's aftermath, China legalized opium; smugglers
became registered importers; plodding steamships displaced fast
clippers; and, state monopolies replaced private traders.65 As ad-
diction spread throughout China, imports of Indian opium rose as
well. After peaking in 1880, Indian imports declined slowly for the
rest of the century as cheaper, China-grown opium began to sup-
plant the high-grade Bengal brands. 66 To reduce the drain of Euro-
pean imports, China encouraged local cultivation, which spread
rapidly in the country's southwest regions of Szechwan and Yun-
nan.67 In 1881, the British consul at Yichang estimated the total
opium production in the southwest at 13,525 tons, a figure that atfirst seemed incredible. 68 Twenty-five years later, however, official
statistics showed that Szechwan and Yunnan were in fact producing
19,100 tons, equivalent to 54% of China's total harvest.69 At peak
production in 1906, China harvested 35,000 tons of opium and im-
ported 4000 more to supply 13.5 million addicts, or 27% of its adult
males-a level of mass addiction never equaled by any other na-
tion.' At 35,000 tons, China's annual opium harvest was similar in
size to Japan's tea trade (31,000 tons), Brazil's cocoa crop (39,000
tons), or Colombia's coffee production (55,000 tons).71 Elsewhere
along the Asian zone, opium, much of it destined for markets in
63. GREENBERG, supra note 44, at 221; see also OWEN, supra note 17, at 113-45.
64. A. S. THELWALL, THE INIQUITIES OF THE OPIUM TRADE WITH CHINA: BEING
A DEVELOPMENT OF THE MAIN CAUSES WHICH EXCLUDE THE MERCHANTS OF
GREAT BRITAIN FROM THE ADVANTAGES OF AN UNRESTRICTED COMMERCIAL IN-
TERCOURSE WITH THAT VAST EMPIRE 13 (Win. H. Allen and Co. 1839) ("When the
[opium] habit is once formed it grows till it becomes inveterate; discontinuance is
more and more difficult, until at length the sudden deprivation of the accustomed
indulgence produces certain death.").
65. OWEN, supra note 17, at 214-41 (discussing both the process leading up to
legalization and its aftermath).
66. See ROWNTREE, supra note 44, at 284-85.
67. BooTH, supra note 46, at 147 (stating that poppy cultivation had existed, de-
spite the prohibition edict in 1799, especially in the southwestern provinces).
68. OWEN, supra note 17, at 266-67 ("To put it conservatively, by 1885 China was
probably producing twice as much opium as she was importing.").
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China and Southeast Asia, became Iran's leading export by 1890
and provided farmers three times the income they could earn from
staple food crops.72 By the time Britain formally abandoned its
advocacy of the drug trade in 1907, opium had become a global
commodity.
The Southeast Asian opium trade was another creation of Euro-
pean colonialism. During the nineteenth century, licensed opium
dens became a unique Southeast Asian institution, sustaining mass
addiction and generating revenues. In 1905-06, for example, opium
sales provided 16% of all taxes for the Netherlands Indies, 20% for
Siam, and 53% for British Malaya." In 1930, Southeast Asia had
6441 government opium dens serving 272 tons of opium to 542,100
registered smokers.74 Opium use, legal and illicit, was found
throughout the region, but its spread was uneven. There were no
legal dens in the Philippines after the United States banned opium
in 1906-08. 75 By contrast, French Indochina had 3500 licensed
"opium divans," or one for every 1500 adult males, and was home
to 125,200 opium smokers, or 23% of the region's addicts.76 South-
east Asia's only independent state, the Kingdom of Siam, earned
14% of its tax revenues by selling eighty-four tons of opium
through 972 licensed dens to 164,300 opium smokers, the largest
addict population in Southeast Asia.77 In no other region of the
world did so many governments promote mass drug abuse with
such unanimity of means and moral certitude.
Southeast Asian states promoted opium consumption; however,
they used their coercive powers to suppress both cultivation and
smuggling. To maximize revenue, the region's monopolies im-
ported low-cost Indian opium and then marked it up several fold
for sale to consumers-creating an instant illicit demand for smug-
gled drugs. Because local cultivation would mask contraband,
mainland states adjacent to China tried to suppress tribal cultiva-
tion and intercept smugglers' caravans. In this attempt to seal their
borders with China, French and Thai officials found themselves at
72. ISSAWi, supra note 21, at 239; Lucien Rey, Persia in Perspective, 1/19 NEw LEFr
REvmw 44-46 (March-April 1963); BUREAU OF FOREIGN AND DoMEs-Ic COM-
NIERCE, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES
1915 713 (1916).
73. REP. ON INT'L OPIUM Cot~i'N, supra note 18.
74. Annual Reports of Governments on the Traffic in Opium and Other Dangerous
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war with the hardy Muslim traders of the southwestern province
Yunnan. With their strings of highland horses and formidable
paramilitary skills, the Muslims became the logistic link between
the poppy fields of southern China and the illicit opium dens of
urban Southeast Asia.78
After 1900, Siam and French Indochina found that this overland
smuggling trade was taking a major share of their legal opium mar-
kets. In 1928, for example, French officials formed "a special sur-
veillance corps covering a wide area" along the China-Vietnam
border and attacked seventeen armed caravans with 15.5 tons of
opium, equivalent to 22% of government sales. 79 Similarly, on
Java, the Dutch opium monopoly, a model of colonial efficiency,
promoted a rigorous suppression of sea borne opium smuggling. 0
Despite the spread of mass opium consumption, Southeast Asia
remained a minor producer in the decades before World War II.
Even at its peak in the 1920s, Southeast Asia's sixty tons of opium
was dwarfed by the 6380 tons produced across the border in
China.8' In 1936, for example, the Shan States of Burma harvested
only eight tons of raw opium,82 while Laos and northern Vietnam
together produced 7.5 tons in 1940.83 Reflecting the coercive ca-
pacities of the region's colonial states, Southeast Asia did not de-
velop widespread poppy cultivation until the late 1950s, more than
eighty years after China.
As Mintz posited, opium's growth as a commodity penetrated far
more deeply than trade statistics and tax revenues, changing diet
78. Andrew D.W. Forbes, The Yunnanese ('Ho') Muslims of North Thailand, in
THE MUSLIMS OF THAILAND: VOLUME I HlsTonicAL AND CULTURAL STUDIES 91-95
(1988); Andrew D.W. Forbes, The 'Cin-Ho' (Yunnanese Chinese) Caravan Trade with
North Thailand During the late Nineteenth and Early 7Tventieth Centuries, 21 J. ASIAN
HIST. 1-47 (1987); Moshe Yegar, The Panthay (Chinese Muslims) of Burma and Yun-
nan, 7 J. SE. AsIAN STUD. 80-82 (1966).
79. Advisory Committee on Traffic in Opium and Other Dangerous Drugs, Sum-
mary of Annual Reports, League of Nations Vol. XI, at 5, 29-30 (1930) [hereinafter
Summary of Annual Reports].
80. JAMES R. RUSH, OPIUM TO JAVA 65-82 (1990).
81. Summary of Annual Reports, supra note 79, at 29-30; Advisory Committee on
Traffic in Opium, Application of Part I1 of the Opium Convention with Special Refer-
ence to the European Possessions and Countries in the Far East, League of Nations
Vol. XI-XII (1923) [hereinafter Application of Part I].
82. Advisory Committee on the Traffic in Opium and Other Dangerous Drugs, An-
nual Reports on the Traffic in Opium and Other Dangerous Drugs for the Year 1939,
League of Nations, at 42 (1940).
83. See ASSOCIATION CULTURELLE POUR LE SALUT DE VIET-NAM, TEMOINAGES
ET DOCUMENTS FRANrAis RELATIS A LA COLONISATION FRANVAISE AU VIET-NAM
115 (1945) (quoting Circular no. 875-SAE, July 22, 1942, from Resident Superior of
Tonkin Desalle, to the residents of Laokay, Sonla, and Yenbay).
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and culture.8 In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centu-
ries, southeastern China suffered an acute caloric crisis and
opium's quality as an appetite suppressant may have made its mass
consumption viable, or even economically rational, in times of ex-
treme hardship. Similarly, the spread of mass addiction in the
Western industrial nations in the late nineteenth century was part
of a new diet based on a global trade in proteins and stimulants.
After a century of constant dietary habits, English consumption
of sugar jumped four-fold from 1850 to 1900, while consumption of
tea increased three-fold.Y5 Similarly, in the United States between
1865 and 1902, coffee consumption increased nearly three-fold,
while sugar consumption jumped four-fold.86 The simple eight-
eenth-century diet of milled grains had given way to one spiced
with large quantities of protein (eggs and beef), glucose (sugar),
and stimulants (coffee and tea). If such an energized diet could be
used to stimulate the body during a long working day, then narcot-
ics could be used to relax it in the short hours of rest.
Paralleling the growth of sugar and coffee, American consump-
tion of opium rose over four-fold from the 1840s to the 1890s, and
the number of addicts reached approximately 250,000 by 1900. 7 In
the United Kingdom, sales of patent medicines, most of them
opium-based, increased almost seven-fold between 1850 and
1905. 8 Significantly, the average consumption of opium per 1000
people increased from 1.3 pounds in 1827 to over ten pounds a
half-century later.8 9
PRoI-iBrMON REGIMM
The global campaign for drug prohibition began in the 1870s as
the Protestant churches of England" and America launched a
84. See generally MiNrz, supra note 28.
85. E.J. HOBSBA\VM, INDUSTRY AND EMPIRE: THm MAKNo OF MODERN ENGLISH
SoCIETY 15, 55-56, 119, 311 (1968) (discussing both the social and economic theories
behind the increased purchasing power of the English during the nineteenth century).
86. DEP'T OF COMMERCE & LABOR, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNInD
STATES 1910 536-37, 540 (1911).
87. DAVID T. CouRTWR GHT, DARK PARADISE: OPIATE ADDICTION IN AMERICA
BEFORE 1940 9-28 (1982); DAVID MusTo, THE AMERICAN DISEASE: ORIGINS OF
NARCOTIC CONTROL 5 (1973).
88. TERRY M. PARSSINEN, SECRET PASSIONS, SECRET REMEDIES: NARCOTIC
DRUGS IN BRITISH SOCIETY, 1820-1930, at 32-33 (1983).
89. VIRGINIA BERRIDGE & GRIFFIH EDWARDS, OPIUM AND THE PEOPLE: OPI-
ATE USE IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND 21-35, 274 (1987).
90. Id. at 176-77. The Anglo-Oriental Society for the Suppression of the Opium
Trade was founded in 1874 by a group of Quakers, some of whom were ex-missiona-
ries. Initially a local Birmingham organization, it quickly gained a national focus, and
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moral crusade against the opium trade.91 For the first time in the
modern era, the anti-opium movement, in alliance with the larger
temperance crusade, won national laws that applied the full force
of modem policing and penology to limit the individual's control
over the body. Through a parallel diplomacy from 1909 to 1931,
Western nations adopted restrictions on recreational drug use and
produced a major decline in legal opium production.92 The U.S.
Congress passed the Harrison Narcotics Act in 1914,93 and the
League of Nations adopted restrictions on the recreational use of
heroin and opium in 1931. 94 These laws and treaties comprise, in
sum, something of a social revolution in the relation between law
and individual liberty.
The early anti-opium movement was a loose alliance among Brit-
ish Protestants, China missionaries, and Chinese Imperial officials.
With a generous endowment from a British Quaker, the Anglo-
Oriental Society for the Suppression of the Opium Trade formed in
1874 and soon attracted the patronage of a Catholic cardinal and
the Archbishop of Canterbury.95 For thirty years, moral crusaders
fought a relentless campaign that culminated in 1906 when the
British Parliament passed a motion to end India's opium trade. As
Indian opium shipments declined, China pursued a rigorous anti-
opium campaign that eliminated smoking in Beijing and reduced
cultivation in provinces such as Szechwan. After the revolution in
1911 against the Manchu dynasty, however, the Republican gov-
ernment proved corrupt and opium suppression faltered.96
While Britain engaged in bilateral negotiations with China, the
United States sought a parallel solution through global drug diplo-
macy. After occupying the Philippines in 1898, the United States
discovered that it had inherited a state opium monopoly similar to
by 1876, had moved its offices to King Street, Westminster, near both the India Office
and Houses of Parliament. Id.
91. CouRTwFRGHT, supra note 87, at 78-79. Initial enactment of laws in the U.S.
was on a local level, and largely confined to those areas in the West, and later in the
Northeast, where Chinese immigrants lived and where whites began to experiment
with use of opium. Id. See also BooTH, supra note 46, at 194-95.
92. BooTH, supra note 46, at 180-84 (stating that the net effect of new interna-
tional agreements was to reduce overall world supply of opium from 42,000 tons in
1906 to 8000 tons in 1934).
93. Harrison Narcotics Act, ch. 1, 38 Stat. 785 (1914).
94. BooTH, supra note 47, at 180-84, 198.
95. See OwvEN, supra note 17, at 261-63. The Society was well-funded and quickly
created an official organ, the "Friend of China." Id.
96. BoomH, supra note 46, at 156-59 ("Sun Yat-sen, the mastermind behind the
revolution and the acknowledged father of modern, post-imperial China, raised
money for his cause by taxing all the opium dens in Canton.").
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those elsewhere in Southeast Asia. In 1902, for example, Manila
had 190 dens retailing a total of 130 tons of opium.97 In 1903, the
colonial regime appointed the Episcopal missionary Bishop
Charles Brent to an investigative Opium Commission that recom-
mended prohibition.98 Although opium smuggled from China met
the illicit demand, drug abuse in the Philippine Islands soon de-
clined to levels far below other Southeast Asian colonies. 99
Whatever its actual impact might have been, the Philippine ban
won fame for Bishop Brent and launched America's attempt at
global drug diplomacy. Aware that opium smuggled from China
was sabotaging the Philippine prohibition, the Bishop wrote Presi-
dent Theodore Roosevelt, persuading him to convene an interna-
tional conference to assist the Philippine struggle against the drug
trade. With Bishop Brent as the chair, delegations from thirteen
countries-including Britain, France, Persia, Siam, and China-
met at Shanghai for a month in 1909.100 As the conference con-
vened, the U.S. delegate Hamilton Wright, a physician and moral
crusader, successfully lobbied the U.S. Congress for passage of the
Smoking Opium Exclusion Act,10 1 which banned all imports of
non-medicinal opium.10 2 In unanimous, non-binding resolutions,
the Shanghai Commission defended the colonial interest by advis-
ing "the gradual suppression.., of opium," the drug its members
did sell; and urging "drastic measures" against the "grave danger"
of morphine, the drug its members did not sell.1 0 3 Thus, the Com-
mission left a mingled legacy; defending Asia's colonial opium
trade while simultaneously launching a global anti-narcotics diplo-
macy. To prepare for the next conference, delegate Wright, using
spurious claims of rising U.S. drug abuse, worked, unsuccessfully,
97. See REP. ON INT'L OPitUM~ COMM'N, supra note 18, at 21-26.
98. See MusTo, supra note 45, at 25-28. Charles Henry Brent was appointed the
first Episcopal bishop of the Philippines in 1902, travelling there with the returning
colonial governor, William Howard Taft. Brent began as a general missionary bishop,
working to develop schools and hospitals for the poor. It was through this work that
he encountered the opium problem in the Philippines. Id.
99. See REP. ON THE INT'L OPIUM COMM'N, supra note 18.
100. MUsTo, supra note 45, at 28-37; PETER D. Lowes, THE GEmsis oF INTERNA-
TnONAL NARCOTICS CONTMOL 102-11 (1966). The Chinese, nominally the host nation
of the conference, were initially wary of the aims of the delegations. Eventually, the
Chinese came to view the conference as a benefit, expressing appreciation at being
treated as equals,
101. Smoking Opium Exclusion Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 176-185 (1909) (repealed 1970).
102. CoutRwiorHT, supra note 87, at 29-30, 82 (stating that then Secretary of State
Elihu Root drafted the bill to give Wright and the U.S. delegation the sheen of moral
leadership at the Shanghai Conference).
103. See REP. ON INT'L OPIuMI COMM'N, supra note 18.
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with allies in the U.S. Congress for passage of the Foster Anti-nar-
cotic Bill10 4 that would have required registration of all narcotics
sales.' 05
Two years later, the United States convened a second round of
global drug diplomacy, the International Conference on Opium at
the Hague. With the support of President William Taft, who knew
Brent from colonial service in Manila, the Bishop again chaired the
Conference and maintained its moral momentum against the colo-
nial interest.0 6 Moving beyond the mere recommendations of
Shanghai, these sessions drafted The Hague Opium Convention of
1912 that required each signatory nation to pass its own domestic
drug legislation. As a party to these proceedings, the Congress en-
acted the Harrison Narcotics Act in 1914-a modestly progressive
compromise that required a doctor's prescription to purchase nar-
cotics. 10 7 The Internal Revenue Bureau adopted a strict interpreta-
tion and pressed indictments against so-called "dope doctors" and
addicts for conspiracy to violate the Act, winning a Supreme Court
decision in 1919.108
Before the Hague Convention could take effect, World War I
intervened, delaying further drug diplomacy until the League of
Nations convened the Geneva Conference of 1925. Under the Ge-
neva Narcotics Convention and its later protocols, drug controls
moved away from voluntary national laws to mandatory interna-
104. Idt The complete text of the Foster Bill is appended to the REPORT. For a
more complete discussion of the Foster Bill, see COuR RmGHT, supra note 88, at 103-
04.
105. CouRTwirHT, supra note 87, at 28-29 ("By training a physician and a scien-
tist, Wright was by instinct a politician and not above bending facts to achieve legisla-
tive ends.").
106. MusTo, supra note 87, at 50 (stating that Bishop Brent "symbolized ... Amer-
ican moral stewardship").
107. CouRTpVIuowrr, supra note 87, at 105-06 ("In many respects the Harrison Act
was a classic piece of progressive legislation: reform effort (restrict the sale of narcot-
ics) met business self-interest (rationalize the narcotic market) to produce a compro-
mise measure. Large pharmaceutical firms were perfectly willing to see small-time,
unregistered peddlers prosecuted; enlightened and professionalized pharmacists
agreed to restrict sale to those possessing a prescription . . . ."); see also TAYLOR,
supra note 19, at 120, 129-31 (discussing the legislative history behind enactment of
the Harrison Narcotics Act).
108. CouRTwRIGHT, supra note 87, at 106-07 (discussing Webb v. United States,
249 U.S. 96 (1919)). Dope doctors were licensed physicians who, for a fee, granted
prescriptions to addicts. Id. at 107. "During a single month one New York doctor
'wrote scrip' for 68,282 grains of heroin, 54,097 grains of morphine, and 30,280 grains
of cocaine." Id.
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tional controls over the production and sale of drugs.109 Re-
strained by the colonial lobby, this diplomacy produced
international treaties that gradually restricted the right of govern-
ments to trade in narcotics. Although none of Southeast Asia's
states abolished their monopolies, all made gestures that reduced
the region's opium sales by 65% in the fifteen years after World
War I. The Netherlands Indies, for example, cut the colony's con-
sumption by 88%, from 127 to fifteen tons of opium.'10 Multilat-
eral controls thus reversed the century-long climb in drug abuse-
reducing world opium production from 41,600 tons in 1907 to an
estimated 16,000 tons in 1934; and licit heroin production from
20,000 pounds in 1926 to only 2200 in 1931.111
Nonetheless, the high profits inherent in the opiates traffic re-
mained and sustained criminal syndicates, which now acted as an
invisible market response limiting state control over the drug
trade."' In their trafficking, criminal syndicates would increasingly
ignore the odorous, bulky opium and concentrate on a compara-
tively new derivative, heroin. First manufactured commercially in
1898, heroin had attributes-high value for weight, compact,
odorless, and highly addictive-that would make it an ideal crimi-
nal commodity.
From the outset of drug prohibition in the 1920s, each act of sup-
pression produced an equal and opposite criminal reaction. In the
decade following the League's opium ban in 1925, Shanghai
emerged as a major center for illicit heroin, supplying a substantial,
109. Vladamir Kusevic, Drug Abuse Control and International Treaties, 7 J. DRUG
IssuEs 35, 36 (1977) (discussing the difficulty in enforcing the various drug control
regimes against signatories); BERTIL A. RENBORO, INTERNATIONAL DRUG CoNTRoU
A STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL ADMINISTRATION By AND THROUGH THE LEAGUE OF
NATIONS 20-26 (1944).
110. APPLICATION OF PART IL supra note 81, at 4; ANNUAL REPORTS FOR 1935,
supra note 74, at 70-71.
111. See REP. ON THE INT'L OPIUMn COMM'N, supra note 18; ANNUAL REPORTS FOR
1935, supra note 74, at 46-47 (reporting world production at 7653 tons for 1934, with
6378 of that total coming from China). That same year, the U.S. Treasury Department
attach in China reported an illicit traffic of 28,000 tons. Letter from M.R. Nicholson,
U.S. aTeasury Attache, Shanghai, to Commissioner of Customs, Annex 2 2-7 (July 12,
1934) (on file at Pennsylvania State University, Historical Collections and Labor
Archives, Harry Anslinger Papers) [hereinafter Nicholson Letter]. I am indebted to
Alan Block for calling my attention to the Nicholson reports. The adjusted world
figure of 16,000 tons cited above is a rough compromise between these two figures for
China's production.
112. Alan A. Block, European Drug Traffic and Traffickers Between the Wars: The
Policy of Suppression and its Consequences, 23 J. SOCIAL HIsT. 322-23 (1989) (discuss-
ing the "Black List" used by the League of Nations to track criminal syndicates in-
volved in heroin trafficking).
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but unquantifiable, share of the U.S. market." 3 In 1931, the
League of Nations imposed restrictions on the manufacture of her-
oin in Europe, and just three years later the U.S. Treasury attache
in Shanghai noted a "sudden shift of the traffic in narcotics from
Europe to the Orient.""14 Similarly, in Southeast Asia, the
League's efforts reduced legal opium sales, but could not eradicate
the mass demand cultivated by three centuries of colonial rule. As
soon as governments slashed imports or closed opium dens, traf-
fickers emerged to service the unmet demand. With 50% of the
region's smokers and 70% of its dens, Bangkok and Saigon were
Southeast Asia's premier opium markets, offering high profits
which drew the caravans southward from the opium hills of Yun-
nan and Burma. 1 5
COLD WAR ExPANSION
The half-century of global warfare that began with World War H
and continued into the Cold War transformed the character of the
global opium trade. In an age when warfare gave the major powers
unequaled coercive capacities, a modem prohibition regime finally
eradicated the remnants of legal opium trading. But the Cold War
was also marked by a geopolitics that encouraged alliances with
criminal syndicates at the interstices of global confrontation. This
contradictory policy of simultaneously prohibiting and protecting
the global opium traffic shaped the heroin trade during the Cold
War.
During World War II, restrictions on shipping and strict port se-
curity produced a marked hiatus in global opium trafficking. With
only limited supplies of low-grade heroin from Mexico, the U.S.
addict population plummeted in just four years to an historic low of
some 20,000 by the end of the war.116
In the succeeding forty years of the Cold War, the interaction of
prohibition and protection seemed to define the global drug trade.
Above all, the communist victory in China soon eliminated the
world's largest producer and consumer of opium. 1 7 Although the
Asian opium zone contracted geographically, geopolitics, com-
113. TAYLOR, supra note 19, at 283.
114. Nicholson Letter, supra note 111, at 18-26.
115. Annual Reports for 1935, supra note 74, at 72-75.
116. BOOTH, supra note 46, at 203 (stating that the addict population dropped from
200,000 to 20,000 due to the war-time disruption in supply).
117. Id. at 305 (stating that when the Communists took over, Mao Zedong's poli-
cies ceased opium production and addiction for nearly forty years).
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bined with illicit market forces, stimulated a steady increase in pro-
duction within the remaining area, which now stretched from
Thrkey to Thailand. Led by the United Nations and United States,
the global prohibition regime reached about the globe, finally forc-
ing Southeast Asian states to abolish their legal opium
monopolies.ln s
After the legal opium trade was fully banned by 1961, the U.S.
and U.N. then turned to eradication of illegal poppy cultivation
and the pursuit of criminal traffickers. Simultaneously, however,
covert agencies found urban criminals and upland warlords useful
allies in the prosecution of the Cold War, providing de facto politi-
cal protection for drug dealers in key source regions.119 Since
Asia's opium zone coincided with a major frontier of anti-commu-
nist containment, the continent's southern rim became a covert
battleground, periodically erupting in bloody, protracted warfare.
In the first decades after World War H, Asia's opium zone func-
tioned within localized trading spheres in the continent's southeast
and southwest. Over time, however, covert warfare operations and
rising global opium demand drew these disparate regions into the
international drug traffic and integrated this southern rim into a
coherent drug production zone. 20
In Southeast Asia, the region's opium trade experienced a fun-
damental transformation that produced the present-day Golden
Triangle. After a century of state opium sales, mainland Southeast
Asia, under U.N. pressure, finally abolished its legal monopolies
between 1950 and 1961. Simultaneously, the region's intelligence
agencies allowed state-sponsored para-military groups to control
the now-illicit traffic. Seeking a second front against communist
China in the Korean War, President Harry Truman ordered the
Central Intelligence Agency ("CIA") to mobilize some 12,000 of
the Nationalist Chinese remnants camped just inside Burma for a
clandestine invasion of southwestern China.' After their incur-
sions were repulsed in 1951-52, the Nationalist troops occupied
118. Id. at 188-89.
119. ALFRED W. McCoy, THE PoLITIcs OF HEROIN: CIA COMPLICrrY IN THE
GLOBAL DRUG TRADE (1991) (discussing an intricate web in which the CIA granted
protection to drug traffickers as part of a larger scheme against communism). "The
CIA went to great lengths to ban [McCoy's] book, claiming it was a threat to national
security whilst it was really an embarrassing expose of America's obsession with and
mismanagement of the Communist threat, and the ineffectuality of Cold War strate-
gies." BOOTH, supra note 46, at 257-58.
120. BOOTH, supra note 46, at 256-59.
121. Id. at 259.
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Burma's northeast for another decade, turning to opium to finance
their operations.122 By forcing local hill tribes to produce the drug,
these Chinese troops (called Kuo Min Tang, or "KMT") presided
over a massive increase of poppy cultivation on the Shan Plateau-
from some eighteen tons in 1958 to an estimated 400 to 600 tons in
1970.123 Nonetheless, the region's opium traffic was still self-con-
tained until 1970, producing opium for urban smokers in cities such
as Bangkok, Saigon, and Hong Kong. Then, in 1969-70, a cluster of
heroin refineries opened in the Golden Triangle, first supplying
U.S. soldiers fighting in South Vietnam and later exporting to mar-
kets in America and Europe.
In Southwest Asia, the region's opium traffic followed a similar
pattern and most production was absorbed in regional markets,
leaving only limited amounts for export to the West. Despite an
imperfect ban on consumption between 1955 and 1969, Iran's cities
remained the world's largest consumer of opium and absorbed
most surplus production from neighboring nations-Turkey, Paki-
stan, and Afghanistan. 124 Though the Turkish Marketing Organiza-
tion was a legal pharmaceutical producer, Anatolian farmers
diverted surplus production to illicit markets in Iran and France,
thereby supplying the morphine base for some 80% of America's
illicit heroin demand.
In these transitional decades to the full prohibition regime,
Asia's opium production was low, markets were largely regional,
and heroin production was, until 1970, insignificant. In the 1970s,
however, President Richard Nixon's drug war would produce a
radical transformation in Asia's drug trade, inadvertently integrat-
ing it more fully into the international traffic.
BILATERAL SUPPRESSION
In 1972, U.S. drug suppression entered the global arena when
President Richard Nixon declared "war on drugs"-the first in a
succession of American drug wars that have continued to the pre-
sent. In the first battle of his drug war, Nixon attacked Turkish
opium production, then the second-highest in Southwest Asia.
Here he won total victory, eradicating nearly all of Turkey's opium
122. Id.
123. CHAO TzANG YAWNGHWE, THE SHAN OF BuRMA: MEMOIRS OF A SHAN Ex-
i.E 57 (1987); WORLD OpiUM SURVEY, supra note 16, at 10-11.
124. DiRcroRATE OF INTELLIGENCE, U.S. CENTRAL INTELLiGENcE AGENCY, IN.-
TELLiGENCE MEMORANDUM: NARcoTxcs IN IRAN, No. 13 1-2 (1972).
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cultivation and closing Marseille's heroin laboratories.'25 In the
next battle, the Nixon White House shifted its attack to Southeast
Asia, focusing on Bangkok's exports. By the mid-1970s, the street
price of heroin in New York had tripled and purity dropped by
half-both strong indicators of a serious shortage.1 26 Nixon was
victor in the first of America's four drug wars. 127
In his success, Nixon defined the character of subsequent drug
wars by applying the full coercive resources of the U.S. govern-
ment to eradicate production in source regions for the American
market. After heavy diplomatic and military pressure on allies to
join his assault on cultivation and refining, Nixon then dispatched
U.S. narcotics agents to track down traffickers who had survived
this broad-brush suppression. In sum, Nixon's drug war provided
an impressive, and unparalleled, demonstration of the coercive ca-
pacities of the world's paramount power.
But the invisible dynamics of the drug market soon turned vic-
tory into defeat. Instead of reducing global supply, Turkish eradi-
cation stimulated both opium production and heroin consumption.
Why this unexpected outcome? Though Turkey was the source for
some 80% of U.S. heroin supply, it produced only 7% of the raw
poppy in Asia's opium zone.128 With demand constant and 'fTr-
key's supply eradicated, the illicit world price rose, stimulating
opium production elsewhere along the continent's vast southern
rim, particularly in Southeast Asia. From this predictable, but un-
recognized market logic, every short-term victory, every successful
eradication or crop substitution, would become a market stimulus
that brought another defeat for America's drug wars.
Predictably, Nixon's victory in Turkey unleashed market forces
that would ultimately expand both production and consumption of
illicit narcotics. Responding to the stimulus of Turkish eradication,
the Chinese syndicates of Southeast Asia began exporting their
125. BooTH, supra note 46, at 250-51 (stating that Nixon's use of political and eco-
nomic pressure on lrkey eliminated the opium source for the Marseille laboratories,
thus dealing a devastating blow to the infamous "French Connection"). For more in-
formation regarding Nixon's drug policy, see Michael Massing's, THE Fix (1998).
126. STAFF OF HOUSE OF REPRESENTATrVES COMM. ON INT'L RELATIONS, 94TH
CONG., REPORT ON THE EiFncrvENEss OF TURmSH OPIUM CONTROL 1-7, 38-71
(Comm. Print 1975); John T. Cusack, Turkey Lifts the Poppy Ban, DRUG ENFORCE-
MEreNT, Fall 1974, at 3-7 [hereinafter Cusack, Turkey Lifts Ban].
127. See, e.g., John T. Cusack, A Review of the International Drug Traffic, DRUG
ENFORCEMENT, Spring 1976, at 34-35 (stating that heroin seizures in 1975 totaled 470
kilograms, 55% over the amount seized in 1974 and 115% over the amount seized in
1973) [hereinafter Cusack, Review of Drug Traffic].
128. WORLD OpItUM SURVEy, supra note 16, at 10-11.
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surplus heroin to America. Rising from insignificant levels in the
late 1960s, Southeast Asian heroin captured 29% of New York's
street supply by 1972.129 In Chicago, Southeast Asia's share
jumped from 6% of all samples seized in 1972 to 48% in 1973.130
By 1973, Southeast Asia's share of the U.S. heroin market had
more than doubled to 30%.131 Concerned about rising seizures of
Southeast Asian heroin, the Nixon administration dispatched a
fire-break team of thirty Drug Enforcement Administration
("DEA") agents to Bangkok in 1973-74 to cut the flow. Armed
with a financial war chest of $12 million in narcotics assistance
funds, the Bangkok DEA began making substantial seizures of
U.S.-bound heroin-creating a de-facto customs barrier that dis-
couraged exports to America.132 By the end of 1975, Southeast
Asia's share of the U.S. market had dropped back down to only
8%, leaving a demand that was partially met by rising Mexican
production.133
Since the DEA had not eradicated opium cultivation in Burma
nor closed the heroin refineries in Thailand, its seizures simply er-
ected a de-facto customs barrier that deflected exports from the
United States to other markets. Blocked from entry into America,
Southeast Asian syndicates began exporting to Europe and Austra-
lia-continents that had been virtually heroin-free for decades.13 4
Total European seizures of Southeast Asian No. 3 heroin jumped
from twenty-two pounds in 1972 to 873 in 1978.13- In West Ger-
many, deaths from heroin overdoses increased from nine in 1969 to
623 a decade later.136 By 1976, European seizures of 1177 pounds
of heroin, almost all from Southeast Asia, were higher than the
129. U.S. DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMiN., HEROIN SOURCE IDENTIFICATION FOR
U.S. HEROIN MARKET (1972, 1973, 1974, 1975) [hereinafter DEA REPORT].
130. Id.
131. STAFF OF HousE OF REPRESENTATrVES COMM. ON INT'L RELATIONS, 94TH
CONG., PROPOSAL TO CONTROL OPIUM FROM THE GOLDEN TRIANGLE AND TERMI-
NATE THE SHAN OPIUM TRADE 91 (Comm. Print 1975).
132. STAFF OF HOUSE OF REPRESENTATVES COMM. ON INT'L RELATIONS, THE
NARCOTICS SITUATION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA: THE ASIAN CONNECTION, H.R. Doc.
No. 94-096, at 38-40 (1975).
133. DEA REPORT, supra note 126.
134. Laura M. Wicinski, Europe Awash with Heroin, DRUG ENFORCEMENT Sum-
mer 1981, at 14-15 (stating that much of the increased heroin traffic in Europe during
the late 1970s flowed from Southwest Asia).
135. John T. Cusack, Review of Drug Traffic, supra note 124, at 34-35; Heroin
Seized in Europe During 1978, DRUG ENFORCEMENT, February 1979, at 20-21;
Michael A. Antonelli, In Europe: An Incursion of Asian Heroin, DRUG ENFORCE.
MENT, Winter 1975, at 32.
136. Wicinski, supra note 131, at 16.
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U.S. total-indicating that Europe's drug problem had, in only five
years, begun to rival America's.137 Similarly, in Australia narcotics
arrests in the state of New South Wales increased five-fold from
173 in 1972 to 909 five years later; while over-dose deaths were up
three-fold from fourteen in 1974 to forty-nine in 1976.138
Inside the United States, the illicit drug market responded to the
decline in imported narcotics by substituting domestic synthetics.
As Asian heroin imports dropped in the mid 1970s, organized
crime syndicates saw the opportunity and illicit amphetamine labo-
ratories soon dotted the northeastern United States, with a signifi-
cant cluster that made Philadelphia the "speed capital of the
world."139
Despite some initial success, America's drug war thus had pro-
duced a paradoxical strengthening of the global narcotics traffic.
By the late 1970s, the simplex of the Turkey-Marseilles-New York
heroin pipeline had been replaced by a complex of international
smuggling routes that tied the disparate zones of First World con-
sumption to Third World narcotics production. With production
and consumption now dispersed about the globe, the international
traffic was far more resistant to suppression than ever before.
Operating on a law-enforcement model of localized vice sup-
pression, the United States had applied the coercive apparatus of
arrest, seizure, and eradication without considering the complex
market dynamics of the illicit opium trade. With global demand
constant, a sudden supply reduction in one sector simply raised il-
licit prices and stimulated increased cultivation elsewhere across
the vastness of the Asian opium zone. In essence, the four U.S.
drug wars of the past quarter-century extended a local law enforce-
ment model into the international arena in ways that would con-
tribute to an increase in world opium supply from 1000 tons in 1970
to 3700 tons in 1989.
Although Nixon's drug war thus stimulated the global market, its
impact on U.S. domestic demand was more ambiguous. In the late
137. Mathea Falco, Asian Narcotics: The Impact on Europe, DRUG ENFORCEMENT,
February 1979, at 2, 3 (stating that the amount of heroin seized in Europe was "partic-
ularly significant" when one considered that the number of addicts in the U.S. is
nearly double that in Europe).
138. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. UPON DRUGS, N.S.W. PARLIAMENT, PROGREss RE.
PORT, at 125, 28, 129-33 (1978).
139. Philip Jenkins, Narcotics Trafficking and the American Mafia. The Myth of In-
ternal Prohibition, 3 CRIME, LAw & SOCIAL CHANoE 312, 312-16 (1992); Illicit
Methamphetamine Laboratories in the Pennsylvania/New Jersey/Delaware Area: Hear-
ing Before the House of Representatives Select Comm. on Narcotics Abuse and Con-
trol, 96th Cong. 2-3 (1980) (statement of Rep. Lawrence Coughlin).
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1970s, every indicator pointed to a marked decline in U.S. heroin
supply. The estimated number of heroin addicts plummeted. Her-
oin purity declined markedly in New York City, reaching a low of
3%.140
Why the decline? We cannot answer with any certainty. Per-
haps Nixon's drug war may have actually succeeded in disrupting
the flow of drugs into the United States. Mexico soon captured
nearly 90% of the remaining U.S. heroin market, but its erratic
shipments of crude No. 3 heroin somehow failed to satisfy Ameri-
can demand for the pure No. 4 powder no longer available from
Europe or Southeast Asia. Looking at these changes, we could
conclude that Nixon's drug war had actually worked. Examining
other evidence, however, we could attribute this decline to Presi-
dent Jimmy Carter's foreign policy, particularly his ban on major
CIA covert operations from 1976 to 1978 that may have removed
the protection that drug lords seem to require. Similarly, the
Carter administration's abandonment of the drug war might have
stilled the stimulus of prohibition. Given the complexities of the
global drug trade, we cannot decide this issue with absolute cer-
tainty. Nonetheless, a survey of the global traffic indicates that
prohibition and protection were, on balance, significant factors-in
both the decline of heroin supply in the 1970s and its increase dur-
ing the 1980s.
OPIUM HARVESTS OF TIE 1980s
Whatever the cause of the opiates decline in the 1970s, an imper-
fect coercion and the legacy of covert protections led to an increase
in the U.S. and European heroin problem in the next decade. In
this twilight of the Cold War, highland drug lords became indepen-
dent entrepreneurs powerful enough to shape the direction of
Western drug markets, sending vast new supplies of Asian heroin
into Europe and America.
During the 1980s, a changing mix of prohibition and protection
allowed an unprecedented increase in opium cultivation. After the
U.S. withdrawal from the Southeast Asian mainland in 1975, war-
lords, notably the National Chinese (KMT) militia and Lao mili-
tary, who had depended upon foreign patrons faded; and drug
lords with deeper local roots emerged. Though covert operations
in Burma had ended, their legacy persisted through former assets
active in the traffic and the chaos in the country's northeast border-
140. See Cusack, Turkey Lifts Ban, supra note 123, at 3-7.
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lands. While Thai protection for drug syndicates gradually dimin-
ished, Burma allied openly with ethnic warlords in ways that
allowed a sustained growth in opium production. By the mid-
1980s, a rising ethnic warlord, General Khun Sa, had seized control
of the Burma borderlands from the KMT militia. After imposing
his leadership over the factionalized Shan ethnic rebels, Khun Sa
used the strategic borderlands and his centralized command to en-
courage a 500% increase in Burma's opium production-from 550
tons in 1981 to 2430 in 1989.141 Not surprisingly, between 1984 and
1990, Southeast Asia's share of New York City's heroin supply
jumped from 5% to 80%.142 In 1989-1990, this flood of Southeast
Asian heroin lowered the wholesale price of "China white" in New
York City from $100,000 a kilogram to only $60,000, undercutting
the cocaine market and creating a new clientele for the drug.
Crack addicts seeking an easier withdrawal reportedly were using
heroin in large quantities, as were those mixing the two drugs for a
more prolonged euphoria.143 After reporting that heroin-related
arrests by New York City's narcotics police jumped from 1% to
19% of their total arrests, John Polemba, state commissioner of
criminal justice services, commented that "the use of heroin is be-
coming more prevalent, especially as crack users get into heroin to
help them come down." 144
This extraordinary growth in Burma's harvest was, in some mea-
sure, a market response to the success of the U.N. opium eradica-
tion program in neighboring Thailand. After Nixon declared his
drug war in 1972, the United States pursued major anti-narcotics
141. 1997 REPORT, supra note 8, at 23; BUREAU OF INT'L NARCOTICS MATTERS,
U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL STRATEGY REPORT,
1989, at 271-79, 286 (1990); BUREAU OF INT'L NARCOTICS MATTERS, U.S. DEP'T OF
STATE, INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL STRATEGY REPORT, 1983, at 101
(1984) [hereinafter 1983 REPORT].
142. See Steven Erlanger, Southeast Asia is Now No. 1 Source of U.S. Heroin, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 11, 1990, at 26.
143. Charles B. Rangel, The Killer Drug We Ignore, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 1990, at
21 (stating that cocaine addicts often use heroin to counteract the debilitating effects
of cocaine burnout). Charles B. Rangel, Democratic Congressman from New York,
also argues that law enforcement and the media have been preoccupied with the
"menace of cocaine and crack" and have not devoted enough attention to rising her-
oin use. Id. Another explanation offered for heroin's increased popularity is that
higher levels of purity allow the drug to be smoked much easier. Id. "Today's purer
heroin is attracting users who previously avoided the drug because of the fear of
needles and AIDS." Id.
144. Associated Press, Rise in Drug Arrests is Reported in New York, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 12, 1989, at 46 (stating that heroin-related arrests in New York City increased
from 1% to 19% of arrests, compared with the same quarter of 1988).
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programs in both Thailand and Burma. But there was a difference.
While the DEA worked closely with Thai police in Bangkok and
on the border, Washington had to buy its way into Burma.145 Be-
tween 1974 and 1978, Rangoon accepted eighteen helicopters
under the U.S. narcotics assistance program and cooperated with
Thai police in sweeps against smugglers along their common
border. 46In the mid 1980s, moreover, the DEA worked with the Burmese
to defoliate some 60,000 acres of Shan State forest with the lethal
2,4-D chemical. 47 Despite these displays of cooperation, Rangoon
diverted U.S. resources to counter-insurgency efforts and protected
favored drug lords like Khun Sa and Lo Hsing-han.148 By the time
the U.S. suspended its aid program in 1988 to protest the massacre
of pro-democracy demonstrators in Rangoon, everyone in the U.S.
mission, except the DEA, regarded it as an expendable failure. 149
By contrast, Thailand, in close cooperation with the U.S. and
U.N., attacked the foundations of the traffic, forcing a steady de-
cline in illicit opium output, from 145 tons in 1970 to only twenty-
four tons in 1992-virtually eliminating poppy cultivation in most
tribal villages.150 By the late 1980s, Thailand had become a net
heroin consumer and, from a U.S. perspective, was winning the
drug war.15' Within the inexorable logic of the global traffic, a bat-
tle won somewhere along the Asian opium zone is soon lost else-
where. In this case, victory in Thailand meant defeat in Burma.
During the 1980s, the steady eradication of illicit drugs in Thai-
land drove the traffic across the border, contributing to the dra-
145. MARTIN SMITH, BuRmA: INSURGENCY AND THE PoLrcs OF ETH Icrry 314
(1991); Bertil Lintner, Triangular Ties, FAR EASTERN ECON. REv., March 28, 1991, at
22-23.
146. BURMA: A COUNTRY STUDY 228 (Frederica M. Bunge ed., 1983).
147. SMrTH, supra note 142, at 314.
148. For a more detailed discussion of drug lords such as Khun Sa, see Alfred W.
McCoy, Requiem for a Drug Lord: State and Commodity in the Career of Khun Sa, in
STATES AND ILLEGAL PRACTICES 129-67 (Josiah McC. Heyman ed., 1999).
149. Lintner, supra note 142, at 23. In the late-1980s, the U.S. financed an opium
defoliation program costing $18 million a year. Id Critics of the program argued that
instead of stemming drug production, defoliation prompted increased poppy cultiva-
tion to offset potential losses. Id.
150. 1997 REPORT, supra note 8, at 23.
151. Yuli Ismartono, Thailand: From Narcotics Exporter to Opium and Heroin Im-
porter, INTER PRESS SERV., Feb. 25, 1993, available at 1993 WL 2533373 (discussing
the success of government-sponsored crop-substitution and rural development pro-
grams in reducing drug production).
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matic, five-fold increase in Burma's harvest.1 52 As smoking opium
disappeared from northern Thai villages, local addicts began inject-
ing Burmese heroin, sharing needles in ways that led to a virulent
AIDS epidemic in the late 1980s.15 3 In the first nine months of
1988, the HIV rate among intravenous drug users in Bangkok in-
creased from less than 1% to 37%; and by 1990 an estimated
500,000 Thais were infected.1 54
A somewhat different array of global forces drove an equally
explosive increase in Southwest Asia's heroin output during the
1980s. Reporting from Tehran in 1974, U.S. Ambassador Richard
Helms, the former CIA director, had insisted, accurately enough,
that there was little heroin production in this region-only a local-
ized opium trade.1 5 As a network of heroin laboratories opened
along the Afghan-Pakistan border in 1979-80, Pakistan's opium
production soared to 800 tons, far above its 1971 harvest of some
ninety tons.1 56 Just across the border in neighboring Afghanistan,
opium production also rose sharply. By 1980-81, Pakistan-Afghan
heroin dominated the European market and supplied 60% of U.S.
illicit demand.1 57 Inside Pakistan itself the results were even more
striking. Rising from zero heroin addicts in 1979, Pakistan, accord-
ing to official figures, had 5000 addicts in 1980 and 1,200,000 in
1985.158
Why was Pakistan able to capture the world's heroin market so
quickly? After the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979, the
152. 1997 REPORT, supra note 8, at 23 (showing that Burma's opium production
totaled 2280 tons in 1992).
153. Marjorie A. Muecke, The AIDS Prevention Dilemma in Thailand, 4 ASIAN &
PACIFIC POPULATION FORUM 1, 2-27 (1990); see also Alarming AIDS Forecast in New
WHO Report, AIDS Wa.LY, June 20, 1994 available at 1994 WL 2564367 [hereinafter
AIDS Forecast]. In this 1994 report, the World Health Organization projected as
many as two to four million cases of HIV and up to 650,000 cases of AIDS in Thailand
at the end of the century. Id.
154. ANNOP VISUDHIMARK, JOINT UNrrED NATIONS PROGRAMME ON HIV/AIDS
DRUGS AND AIDS IN THAILAND: SAME POLICIES, DIFFERENT LAWS, 1997 (noting
that 37% of all Thai intravenous drug users were infected with HIV in 1989), at http://
'wv.ihra.netparis/proceedings/visudhihtml; AIDS Forecast, supra note 150 (noting
existence of 500,000 cases of HIV infection in Thailand).
155. Letter from Richard Helms, Ambassador, to Dep't of State, (Mar. 4,1974) (on
file with author).
156. PAKISTAN: A Cour-rry STUDY 140 (Peter R. Blood ed., 1994).
157. Falco, supra note 134, at 2-3; WORLD OPIUM SURVEY, supra note 16, A-7, A-
14, A-17, 1983 REPORT, supra note 138, at 4; William French Smith, Drug Traffic
Today: Challenge and Response, DRUG ENFORCEMENT, Summer 1982, at 2-3.
158. PAKISTAN NARCOTICS CONTROL BD., NATIONAL SURVEY ON DRUG ABUSE IN
PAKISTAN iii, ix, 23, 308 (1986), pp. iii, ix, 23, 308; see also Zahid Hussain, Narco-
power: Pakistan's Parallel Government?, NEWSLINE, December 1989, at 17.
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White House assigned the CIA to mount a major operation to sup-
port the Afghan resistance. Working through Pakistan's Inter-Ser-
vice Intelligence ("ISI"), the CIA began supplying covert arms and
finance to Afghan forces, notably the Hebz-i-Islami party under
Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. 5 9 As they gained control over liberated
zones inside Afghanistan, the Islamic guerrillas pressed supporters
to grow opium as a revolutionary tax and processed it into heroin
across the border in Pakistan's North West Frontier Province.
During this decade of war, Afghanistan's opium production tripled
from 250 tons in 1982 to 750 tons in 1988.160 Under ISI protection,
Pakistani traffickers and Afghan resistance leaders opened hun-
dreds of clandestine labs along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border to
process the raw opium into heroin.16'
OPIUM PROLIFERATION IN THE 1990s
For forty years, the Cold War imposed an artificial, bipolar divi-
sion over the globe that led rival superpowers to defend the territo-
rial integrity of their respective clients. With the end of this global
conflict, there has been a recrudescence of the primordial politics
of religion, regionalism, race, and ethnicity that may weaken the
capacities of key states within Asia's opium zone. Driven by these
and other forces, heroin recovered its historic preeminence as a
leading illicit narcotic and became, in the 1990s, something of a
"world drug." Expansion of opium cultivation in Burma, Central
Asia, and the Americas fueled a sudden proliferation of heroin
abuse around the globe-a phenomenon that allows us to speak,
without hyperbole, of the globalization of heroin.
With the end of the Cold War, the drug trade entered a new era
with a distinct dynamic. The collapse of the Iron Curtain destroyed
the global template that had shaped the world's opiates traffic for
159. Digital Nat'l Security Archive, Afghanistan: The Making of U.S. Policy (1973-
1990) (discussing U.S. involvement in supplying covert supplies to the Afghan rebels),
at http:138.202.78.21/afessayx.htm.
160. Alfred W. McCoy, Opium History, 1979-1994 (noting 1982 opium production
at 300 metric tons), available at http:I//wv.alb2c3.com/drugs/opiO12.htm (last visited
Oct. 28,2000); see also ArGHA.NIsrAN POLICS (noting 1988 opium production as 750
metric tons), at http://vv.afghan-politics.orgreference/drugs/opium-productionin_
afghanistan.htm.
161. 1997 REPORT, supra note 8, at 23; James Rupert and Steve Coil, U.S. Declines
to Probe Afghan Drug Trade; Rebels, Pakistani Officers Implicated, WASHINGTON
PosT, May 13, 1990, at Al ("The U.S. government has for several years received, but
declined to investigate, reports of heroin trafficking by some Afghan guerrillas and
Pakistani military officers with whom it cooperates in the war against Soviet influence
in Afghanistan .. ").
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forty years-allowing a rapid expansion of opium cultivation in
former Soviet Central Asia, creating new criminal syndicates, and
opening trafficking routes that now cross China, Russia, and East-
ern Europe. Complicating any attempt at crop reduction, the
world's leading heroin producers, Burma and Afghanistan, became
outlaw states-diplomatically isolated, detached from the world
economy, and economically dependent upon the illicit opium
trade.
During the 1990s, the Rangoon military regime forged alliances
with leading drug lords, stabilizing the traffic but stigmatizing the
state. Through a mix of military pressure on rebel drug lords and
economic support for their rivals, Rangoon's military regime cre-
ated an effective synergy between its increased borderland controls
and expanding heroin traffic. After 1990, Burma, needing hard
currency to buy arms for these operations, changed its tax and ex-
change regulations in ways that channeled illicit income from gems
and drugs into the legitimate sector. 162 In a review of trade figures
for 1995-96, the Centre Frangais du Commerce Extdrieur in Paris
noted $400 million in unexplained inflows and $200 million in de-
fense imports that were possibly financed by an estimated $700
million earned from heroin exports. 63 Rangoon's strategy proved
effective, particularly against General Khun Sa, the country's pre-
eminent opium warlord, long protected by patrons in the Thai and
Burmese military. During the late 1980s, Khun Sa had expanded
heroin exports to the United States-raising street-level purity in
key U.S. markets nearly ten-fold, from 7% to 63%; ending intrave-
nous injection; and changing the demographics of American
opiates use.164 In the early 1990s, however, Khun Sa's embrace of
the Shan secessionist revolt threatened Rangoon with the loss of a
162. Bertil Lintner, Smack in the Face, FAR EASTERN EcoN. R., November 5,1992,
at 24. The Burmese government announced "a four-month tax amnesty that allowed
individuals to declare and pay a 25 percent profits tax on assets they could not show
were obtained legally." I& The U.S. government expressed concern that these actions
facilitated the laundering of drug money. Id.
163. Bertil Lintner, Safe bt Home, FAR EASTERN ECON. R., August 14, 1997, at 18-
19.
164. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DRUG CONTROL 2-7 (1996); NAT'L
NARCOTICS INTELLIGENCE CONSUMERS COMM. 1995, DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE SUPPLY
OF ILLICIT DRUGS TO THE UNITED STATES (1996); see also Erlanger, supra note 139
(discussing the rising influence of Southeast Asian opium); Matthew Purdy, New In-
mates Reflect Surge in Use of Cheap but Potent Heroin, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3,1995, at 49
(stating that "surge in heroin use is partly attributable to the powerful strains of her-
oin now available that allow users to get high by sniffing the drug and avoid the dan-
gers of injection").
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major region and forced the army to launch a massive, sustained
offensive to regain control of these key borderlands.
After Khun Sa's surrender in 1996, surviving warlords accepted
an alliance with the Rangoon junta as the price of survival. Under
the Rangoon regime, Burma remained, until 1998, the world's larg-
est opium producer, with production steady around 2500 tons per
annum. 165 As knowledge of the junta's alliances with drug lords
spread, U.S. Secretary of State Madeline Albright denounced
Burma's military regime in 1997 as drug traffickers and thugs. 166
Burma had, in the eyes of the West, become an outlaw state.
The U.S.-Soviet disengagement from Afghanistan after 1992 and
the break-up of the Soviet Union led to equally dramatic major
changes in Southwest Asia's opium traffic. The superpower with-
drawal from Afghanistan in 1990-1992 unleashed forces that pro-
duced a sudden spread of opium farming. The return of some
three million Afghan refugees to a war-ravaged land created a
need for an annual cash crop, making opium an ideal solution to
this daunting social problem. In 1972, well before the war, a U.S.
cabinet committee had reported that Afghan farmers made $300-
$360 per hectare from opium, twice the average of $175 for fruit:
"There is no substitute crop-except for hashish-that can ... pro-
vide anywhere near an equal income."' 67 As the country plunged
into civil war after 1992, Afghanistan did not have a recognized
government to negotiate either foreign aid or trade agreements, so
its farmers fell back on an established crop with ready markets and
an informal laissez-passer at every customs barrier. Indeed, in late
1991 the United Nations Drug Control Programme had reported
that the Afghan guerrillas, anticipating a cut in CIA support, were
already planting a greatly expanded opium crop as an alternative
source of finance. In mid-1992, a correspondent for the Ob-
servatoire Ggopolitique des Drogues quoted one Afghan farmer
saying: "I fought in the Jihad for ten years. In 1991, I returned to
my village to farm. I planted 5 % of my land with this filth (opium).
This year, my family has returned from Pakistan to join me, and so
I had to plant 25% this year." In February 2000, unemployment in
165. 1997 REPORT, supra note 8, at 23,266 (citing production of 2500 tons of opium
per year).
166. Steven Erlanger, Asians are Cool to Albright on Cambodians and Burmese,
N.Y. TiMEs, July 28 1997, at A3 (noting Malaysian Prime Minister's criticism of
American involvement in Asian affairs).
167. WORLD OPIuM SURVEY, supra note 16, at A-18.
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the war-ravaged capital Kabul was about 70%, arguably the
world's highest. 168
These social pressures led to a sustained increase in Afghani-
stan's opium harvest. A confidential U.N. report published in Pa-
kistan claimed that Afghanistan's 1991 opium crop was already
2000 tons, while privately, U.N. anti-drug officials predicted a 1992
harvest of some 4000 tons-large enough to double the world's il-
licit supply.1 69 Although unseasonable rainfall during harvest de-
stroyed much of that crop, later U.N. field surveys inside
Afghanistan reported a 1994 production of 3300 tons.170 Summing
up these trends in its 1997 opium survey, the U.N. cited "eighteen
years of war"; "extensive damage to the nation's physical and ad-
ministrative infrastructure"; and "a breakdown in the rule of law."
In such a lawless, isolated nation, opium has significant advantages
over conventional crops-notably, in the words of the U.N.,
"credit access, storeability, increasing value over time, permanent
marketability, and easy transportability.' 17 1
Further research found that opium farming spread spontane-
ously through the sorts of market forces that had shaped the Asian
opium zone throughout the twentieth century. U.N. researchers
reported that the Afghan opium trade was "not highly structured
but a relatively free market," and that cultivation thus spread
through "the interdependent nature of labour markets and com-
mercial trade between districts, combined with cross district ethnic
168. Barry Bearak, An Afghan Mosaic of Misery: Hunger, War, and Repression,
N.Y. TIMES, February 25, 2000, at 1 ("Afghans in the countryside are thought to be
better off; they can live off the land. In Kabul, there is nothing to reap from the dead
factories or the shuttered stores."). See also Afghanistan: Opium and Refugees, GEO-
POLITICAL DRUG DISPATCH, August 1992, at 1.
169. BUREAU OF INT'L NARcoTics MATTERS, DEP'T OF STATE, INTERNATIONAL
NARCOTICS STRATEGY REPORT, 22 (1991). For reports of Afghanistan's projected
1992 opium crop, see, Afghanistan: Aiming to be the Leading Opium Producer, GEo.
POLITICAL DRUG DISPATCH, January 1992, at 1, 3.
170. Afghanisian: Aiming to be the Leading Opium Producer, supra note 166, at 1,
3; Afghanistan: All Records Shattered, GEOPOLmCAL DRUG DISPATCH, August 1994,
at 5.
171. UNITED NATIONS INT'L DRUG CONTROL PROGRAMME, AFGHANISTAN: OPIUM
POPPY SURVEY 1997 i, 11 (1997). See also BUREAU FOR INT'L NARCOTCS AND LAW
ENFORCEMENT AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CON-
TROL STRATEGY REPORT, 1999 (2000) ("Cultivators have lived through twenty-two
years of civil war and generally view opium as their only means for survival in a hos-
tile and uncertain environment. Institutional framework, or capacity, and resources to
deal with problems at national, provincial and local levels as well as across different
sectors simply do not exist in Afghanistan."), http://wwv.state.gov/vwwv/global/nar-
coticslav/1999-narc-report/swasi99.html [hereinafter 1999 REPORT].
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and family links." 2 Typically, a young male laborer, pressed by
high prices and low income, becomes an itinerant harvester in
older opium districts. Then, having learned how to cultivate the
crop, he returns to his native village to plant opium on the family
lands. At the next harvest, neighbors follow suit after witnessing
the yield. Then come traders to offer credit and cash for subse-
quent harvests. 73
Despite differences in their crop estimates, both the U.N. and
the U.S. agree that rival factions in the Afghan civil war have
turned to opium and heroin to finance the fighting. According to
U.S. State Department figures, Afghan opium production was 570
tons in 1991, the year U.S. support for the anti-Soviet resistance
ended. 7 4 Then, during the subsequent civil war between 1993 and
1999, the Department estimated that Afghanistan's harvest grew
more rapidly from 685 to 1670 tons.1 75 The U.N.'s annual village-
based surveys, started in 1994, showed an even sharper rise from
2248 tons in 1996 to 4565 tons in 1999-the latter figure equivalent
to 75% of world illicit production. 6 In 1999, the U.N.'s Interna-
tional Narcotics Control Board ("INCB") reported that poppy
"has continued to spread" to new areas under the control of the
Taliban regime which rules 96.4% of the country's opium dis-
tricts. 17 7 The U.S. State Department's 1999 report expressed
strong pessimism about the country's drug control efforts, claiming
that the Taliban collect a 10% tax on the opium harvest, "benefit
directly from the whole opium business," and are "in active collu-
172. UNITED NATIONS DRUG CONTROL PROGRAMME, AFGHANISTAN: STRATEGIC
STUDY #1: AN ANALYSIS OF THE PROCESS OF EXPANsIoN OF OPIUM Poppy CULTIVA-
TION TO NEW DISTRICrS IN AFGHANISTAN 3, 8-14 (1998) [hereinafter Afghanistan:
Strategic Study]; see also BooTH, supra note 46, at 252 ("[Elven had they decided to
act, the Afghan administration would have been powerless. It lacked law enforcement
resources, the poppy-growing areas were geographically remote and inaccessible, the
peasants had no other livelihood, the tribesmen were liable to armed rebellion if they
were interfered with and corruption was endemic.").
173. AFGHANISTAN: STRATEGIC STUDY, supra note 169, at 8-14.
174. 1998 REPORT, supra note 29, at 23.
175. 1999 REPORT, supra note 168 ("According to USO data, as a conservative esti-
mate 1670 metric tons.., of opium were produced from approximately 51,500 hect-
ares.., of poppy. In 1999, poppy cultivation on an additional 10,000 hectares... led
to a 23 percent increase in opium.").
176. GLOBAL ILLICIT TRENDS 2000, supra note 10, at 34 (stating that world illicit
production for 1999 was 5778 metric tons).
177. 1999 STRATEGY, supra note 168 ("Despite UNDCP ... assistance, efforts at
crop eradication, drug supply reduction, counter narcotics law enforcement, and de-
mand reduction have completely failed. In fact, those factions, especially the Taliban,
who control 97 percent of the territory where poppy is grown, promote poppy cultiva-
tion to finance their war machine.").
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sion with smugglers and criminal elements to manufacture and ex-
port heroin. ' 17- By its de facto legalization of the opium traffic,
Afghanistan, along with Burma, had become an outlaw state.
Both opium cultivation and heroin refining have spread rapidly
beyond Afghanistan into former Soviet Central Asia. In its 1999
report, the U.N. expressed concern "about the rapid spread of il-
licit opium cultivation and the traffic in and abuse of drugs, espe-
cially heroin, in countries in central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan) and the Caucasus (Armenia, Azerbai-
jan, and Georgia). ' 179 Moreover, the U.N. warned that "in view of
the overall rise of criminal activities in Central Asia and the Cauca-
sus, drug abuse and illicit drug trafficking, if left unchecked, would
have devastating consequences for societies in those subre-
gions."18 0 Similarly, the U.S. State Department claimed that "mor-
phine and heroin pour across Afghanistan's difficult-to-police
borders with Pakistan, Iran, and the Central Asian Republics of
Tajikistan, Thrkmenistan, and Uzbekistan... destabilizing the en-
tire region." 181 If these trends firm over time, Central Asia may
become a vast opium reservoir at the roof of the world, producing
limitless quantities of low-cost heroin for new generations of users
in Russia, Asia, Europe, and America.
In 1997, the new head of the U.N. Drug Control Programme, Dr.
Pino Arlacchi, launched a program for total eradication of opium
in Afghanistan, then the world's second largest producer, with
modest plans for crop substitution and construction of a single tex-
tile factory.18 Although Kabul's Anti-Narcotics Department fi-
nally announced a poppy eradication program for three districts of
Kandahar Province in May 1999, observers felt that the 325 hect-
ares actually destroyed were an insignificant loss in a region with
5602 hectares under cultivation. Indeed, preliminary U.N. surveys
reported a 30% increase in the country's total area planted in 1999,
178. Id. ("Those in positions of authority have made proclamations against poppy
production but otherwise evidenced no political will to fight narcotics.").
179. UNITED NATIONS INT'L NARCOTICS CONTROL BD., REPORT OF THE INTERNA-
TIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL BoARD FOR 1999, at 49 (1999).
180. Id.
181. 1999 REPORT, supra note 168.
182. Raymond Bonner, Top U.N. Drug Aide Hopes to Rid Globe of Poppy and
Coca Crops, N.Y. Tirms, Nov. 14, 1997, at A4 (describing the U.N.'s ten-year strategy
to eliminate dependency on poppy cultivation beginning with a plan to renovate a
former mill that would employ hundreds in a poppy growing area).
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later yielding a record harvest of 4600 tons that made Afghanistan
the world's leading opium producer.1 83
During the Cold War, the Iron Curtain had served as a massive
anti-narcotics barrier, preventing drug production inside the com-
munist bloc and diverting smuggling around its frontiers. Follow-
ing its collapse, the decade of the 1990s brought dramatic changes
to these borderlands. With the opening of southern China for
trade with Southeast Asia, Burmese drug shipments bound for
Hong Kong are trucked directly across the China's southern prov-
inces-leaving a trail of drug gangs and heroin addicts in their
wake."8 As the Soviet empire broke apart and new nations
formed at its margins, drug syndicates and smuggling proliferated
from Central Asia to Eastern Europe, knitting a cat's cradle of
trafficking routes. From the Balkans through Turkey and the Cau-
casus across the Caspian Sea to Afghanistan, an elaborate smug-
gling trade grew, with guns, cash, and drug-precursor chemicals
traveling east; morphine and heroin moving west.
In this 3000-mile journey by truck, camel, air, and sea, narcotics
sweep westward with surprising speed across a dozen boundaries,
almost immune to interdiction or interference. Yet wherever this
invisible commerce touches ground for processing, packaging, or
exchange, the illicit enterprise quickly ramifies-encouraging drug
production, official corruption, mass addiction, and HIV infection.
Through the alchemy of capitalism, wherever this commodity
comes to rest, mafias form, ethnic separatists arm, and a culture of
criminality crystallizes. By April 2000, only eighteen months after
trafficking reached into central Russia from Afghanistan, the city
of Irkutsk, long free of both drugs and HIV, had registered 8500
heroin addicts and 5000 new HIV cases-with officials fearing that
actual numbers for both could be ten times that high.185 Across
183. Afghanistan: Deceptive 'Destruction' of Laboratories, GEOPOLITICAL DRUG
DISPATCH, April 1999, at 5-6; Tajikistan-Kirghizistan: Heroin Contributes to Social
Collapse, GEOPOLITICAL DRao DISPATCH, June 1999, at 6; Afghanistan: Money Talks
to the Taliban, GEOPOLITICAL DRUG DISPATCH, September 1999, at 7-8.
184. Patrick E. Tyler, China Battles a Spreading Scourge of Illicit Drugs, N.Y.
TrAms, Nov. 15, 1995, at Al (noting that from 1989 to 1995, more than four tons of
heroin were seized each year); Patrick E. Tyler, Heroin Influx Ignites a Growing AIDS
Epidemic in China, N.Y. TIM s, Nov. 28, 1995, at A3 ("The heroin plague has under-
mined the health and stability of thousands of peasant villages.").
185. Michael Wines, Heroin Carries AIDS to a Region in Siberia, N.Y. Timrs, April
24, 2000, at Al ("In the entire Irkutsk region, a Siberian expanse big enough to ac-
commodate France and England in one gulp, health officials had recorded fewer than
200 HIV infections since record keeping began in 1991.... Today a region that hardly
heard of AIDS a year ago has recorded 5,000 cases of HIV infection" and "the true
figures could be as much as 10 times as great, officials say.").
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Russia, in the first half of 1999 heroin use increased 4.5 times over
1998.186
Across these enormous distances with poor communications, ad
hoc alliances within and among ethnic diasporas provide critical,
criminal linkages-Kosovars scattered from Geneva to Macedonia;
Turks from Berlin to Kazakhstan; Armenians from Moscow to
Lebanon; Azerbaijanis from Sumgait to Kyrgyzstan; and Chechens
from Baku to Kazakhstan. In the cities that serve as trading posts
in this traffic-Osh, Tashkent, Samarkand, Baku, Tbilissi, Skopje,
Pristina, and Tirana-extraordinary profits from drugs and guns
have produced mafia gangs, criminal diasporas, tribal warlords, and
rebel armies. In the grand hotels of the Caucasus and the Balkans,
mafias and narco-nationalists have become a distinctive pres-
ence-muscular men with designer suits, high-powered weapons,
and stolen Mercedes sedans. Already attenuated by post-socialist
economic miasma and the strains of new nationhood, state control
and civil society are weakening before the power of these new
narco-mafias with their superior firepower, wealth, and political
influence.
Within this vast swath of the Eurasian landmass-500 miles
north-to-south and 3000 miles east-to-west-an ever-changing web
of smuggling routes traces recurring patterns within four distinct
sectors. As morphine and heroin shipments leave Afghanistan's
state-sanctioned laboratories, they move west through Iran or
north across Tajikistan to Osh and Bishkek in Kyrgyz-
stan-crossing a maze of indefensible, illogical borders, the legacy
of a Stalinist strategy for blocking ethnic secession. Many of the
drugs heading north into Tajikistan pass through Afghanistan's
Kunduz Province, where the Pathan fundamentalist faction Hebz-i-
Islami under Gulbuddin Hekmatyar operated a complex of heroin
laboratories in the late 1990s.1 87 From the Osh drug market, ruled
by the Kyrgyz warlord Bekmanat Osmonov in the mid 1990s, or
lesser trade centers at Dushanbe and Bishkek, drug shipments then
turn westward by air to Moscow and overland directly across Turk-
menistan or circuitously through Kazakhstan.
Once across the Caspian Sea, these diffuse westerly routes fuse
as they enter the Caucasus with its volatile mix of contested bound-
aries, ethnic insurgency, local mafias, and criminal clans. In this
rugged isthmus between the Caspian and Black seas, a volatile ar-
186. Patrick E. lyjler, Russian Vigilantes Fight Drug Dealers, N.Y. TrMus, Mar. 4,
2000, at A4.
187. Digital Nat'l Security Archive, supra note 156.
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ray of armed groups process morphine and smuggle heroin with
near impunity-the Kurdistan Workers Party ("PKK") who manu-
facture heroin in Azerbaijan; local Azerbaijani mafia clans in
Baku, Sumgait, and Nakhichevan; Armenian syndicates allied with
the nationalist Dachnak party; the Azeri Grey Wolves; Ossetian
and Abkhazian separatists in Georgia; and Chechen nationalists.
From the Caucasus, drug shipments, now largely heroin, move
around and across the Black Sea into the Balkans where rival eth-
nic militias use drug profits to purchase arms and pay troops. From
Skopje, Pristina, and Tirana, a Kosovar criminal diaspora smuggles
heroin across the Adriatic Sea and into Western Europe, where
Albanian exiles have, since the early 1990s, used drug profits to
ship Czech and Swiss arm purchases back to Kosovo for separatist
guerrillas. Within Serbia and its satellites, the notorious "Arkan"
(Zeljko Raznatovic), one of several narco-nationalists backed by
Belgrade state security, used drugs, contraband, and counterfeiting
to finance his "Scorpion" gang that terrorized Kosovo and mur-
dered rival Kosovar drug dealers in the mid 1990s.1 18
Despite the end to the Cold War and its superpower rivalries,
many of the local and regional conditions that created Burmese
and Afghan drug lords remain. With the collapse of the Iron Cur-
tain, there has been an eruption of ethnic insurgency along south-
ern frontiers of the former Soviet Union. As states fragment
across the vastness of the Eurasian landmass, regional rebels,
armed with drug money and fighting for power, have begun pro-
ducing opium and heroin in unprecedented quantities. Just as Yun-
nan and Szechwan provinces once produced 19,000 tons of opium
in 1900, so Afghanistan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan are capable,
individually or severally, of comparable harvests today.1 9 Assum-
ing that production in Southeast Asia continues, there is nothing to
check the current trend of world opium supply doubling every dec-
ade-from 5300 tons in 1996 to 10,000 tons in 2007, and 20,000 tons
188. Although Central Asia and the Caucasus region were generally ignored by
Western media, the Observatoire G~opolitique des Drogues in Paris documented these
changes carefully throughout the 1990s. Tadjickistan-Kirgizstan: Heroin Contributes to
Social Collapse, GEOPOLITICAL DRUG DISPATCH, June 1999, at 6; Turkmenistan: A
New Pipeline for Afghan Drug, GEOPOLITICAL DRUO DISPATCH, Feb. 1999, at 5-6;
Tadjikistan: The Fundamentalists' Opium, GEOPOLITICAL DRUG DISPATCH, July 1998,
at 1, 3; Uzbekistan: Stalin's Legacy, GEOPOLITICAL DRUG DISPATCH, May 1997, at 1,
3-4; Turkey: Routes Shift Still Further East, GEOPOLITICAL DRUG DISPATCH, Nov.
1996, at 1, 3-4; Azerbaijan: Mafia Groups Settle Scores in Government, GEOPOLITICAL
DRUG DISPATCH, June 1995, at 1, 3; Yugoslavia: Balkan Route Fuels War, GEoPOLriT.
CAL DRUG DISPATCH, Nov. 1991, at 1, 3.
189. GLOBAL ILLIcrr DRUG TRENDS 2000, supra note 10, at 34.
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in 2017.190 In a few years, we may look back on the Cold War-
with its Asian drug lords, Colombian cartels, and five million
American narcotics addicts-as halcyon days when we had the sit-
uation under some semblance of control.
CONCLUSION
Is this past prologue? Is this history in any sense predictive?
Historians always prefer to sit back, wait for the dust of time to
settle, and then assess a distant past with magisterial certainty.
Sharing my discipline's preferences, I have ventured into predic-
tion with reservations, and now offer some rather tentative policy
prescriptions from this history of Asia's opium trade.
Over the past two centuries, perfect coercion has proven effec-
tive, but imperfect coercion has unleashed a whirlwind of unpre-
dictable consequences. With their near-perfect coercion, European
colonial empires were able to promote cultivation where needed
(India) and suppress it where not (Southeast Asia), fostering a
commodity trade that was, by the late nineteenth century, inte-
grated into the global economy.
In the twentieth century, a global drug prohibition campaign has
produced more ambiguous results. In the last half of the century,
the most dramatic development was China's use of unchecked co-
ercion, within a closed society, to effect a total eradication of all
opium production and use after 1949. Judging by this decisive re-
sult, perfect coercion can effect a dramatic reduction in drug traf-
ficking. However, China's experience is historically unique and
might not be relevant to the more open political systems that have
emerged since 1989. Indeed, during the 1990s, China itself exper-
ienced a sudden surge in drug trafficking as it lessened social con-
trols to encourage development.
Outside the socialist bloc, the League of Nations and, later, the
United Nations have attempted a prohibition on legal opium sales,
producing a sharp but short-term decline in both drug production
and consumption. From the start of drug prohibition in the 1920s,
criminal syndicates emerged to link highland growers and urban
addicts, creating a global drug traffic. A half-century later, Nixon's
drug war repeated this result. Through a forceful application of
bilateral coercion, his campaign crippled the Mediterranean opium
traffic, uprooting poppy fields in Turkey and closing criminal her-
oin laboratories in Marseilles. Over the longer term, however, this
190. Id
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exercise in imperfect coercion unleashed unpredictable market
forces within the Asian opium zone, ultimately stimulating an in-
crease in global opium supply.
Market response to imperfect coercion is complex and unpre-
dictable. Since the 1920s, syndicate response to suppression has
been quick, supple, sophisticated, and often capable of compromis-
ing even the best attempts at coercive intervention. Similarly, even
the most effective opium suppression efforts, bilateral and multilat-
eral, have complex, unforeseen consequences. Over the past quar-
ter-century, it has become evident that suppression efforts,
particularly bilateral initiatives, can stimulate opiates production.
As seen in Turkey during the 1970s and Thailand in the 1980s,
both bilateral and multilateral suppression can effect dramatic
short-term reductions in drug supply that will, in succeeding crop
years, lead to an increase in total global production. The success of
the U.N. program in reducing Thai opium cultivation during the
1980s may well have contributed to the simultaneous increase in
Burma's poppy harvest. Moreover, by raising the price of smoking
opium to addicts in Thailand and thus encouraging heroin injec-
tion, the U.N. suppression program may have contributed to an
epidemic of AIDS infection in Thailand through needle sharing.
Apparently, heroin supplies, when denied entry into one market,
as they were in Southeast Asia during the 1970s, will seek another,
resulting in a proliferation of consumption and an overall increase
in world drug demand. Should such bilateral operations, by some
miracle, succeed in effecting a reduction in supply, then domestic
dealers, repeating the U.S. experience with amphetamines of the
late 1970s, could turn to the manufacture of synthetics.
Any attempt at solving America's heroin problem by reducing
global opium production through a war on drugs thus seems un-
realistic. Successful bilateral eradication has, over the past quarter
century, stimulated both drug production and consumption. Since
America consumes a tiny share of world supply and pays the
world's highest price for illicit drugs, the elimination of U.S. heroin
supply would require that opium cultivation virtually disappear
from the face of the globe. In 1985, for example, the United States
consumed only six tons of opium out of a world production of 1465
tons-just 0.4% of the total.191 In 1997, the White House esti-
191. BUREAU OF INT'L NARCOTICS MATTERS, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, INTERNA-
TIONAL NARCOTICS COrrROL STRATEGY REPORT MARCH 1989 16 (1989); U.S. GEN.
AccOuNTING OFFICE, DRUG CONTROL U.S.-MEXaCO OPIUM POPPY AND MARI-
JUANA AERIAL ERADICATION PROGRAM 16 (1988).
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mated that the United States still consumed "only 3% of the
world's [heroin] production."'192 If the illicit drug traffic operates
like any other market, then America's drug warriors must eradi-
cate some 97% or 99.6% of the world's opium before they finally
get to those last few tons destined for the U.S. market.
As we have seen from past U.S. and U.N. drug control efforts,
the illicit market often reacts in unforeseen ways, transforming re-
pression into stimulus. Before launching crop eradication or crimi-
nal suppression, anti-narcotics agencies need to consider the full
range of possible outcomes. Over the past century, each attempt at
drug prohibition has produced an unexpected market reaction that
has allowed the illicit traffic to adapt, survive, and, in recent years,
even expand. After a century of such unintended consequences, it
may be time to learn from the past and develop strategies for mini-
mizing the negative impact of drug control efforts.
192. NATIONAL STRATEGY, supra note 1, at 51.
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